France has called for the universalisation of comprehensive safeguards agreements. The European Union has conducted outreach dialogue on this aspect, especially towards states which have not yet modified their original Small Quantities Protocols (SQP) to their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.
France and the EU have reiterated it supports the universalisation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguard agreements. France was one of the the countries providing direct contributions to launch the 2024-2026 COMPASS project, an initiative designed to help states build capacity for nuclear safeguards.
EU Statement on Agenda item 7(a): The conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols IAEA Board of Governors Vienna, 1-5 March 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/7a._eu_statement_on_iaea_safeguards_final.pdf
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
EU Statement at the General Debate 68th Regular Session of the General Conference International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Vienna, 16-20 September 2024, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/09/hungary-on-behalf-of-eu-gc68.pdf
Working paper submitted by France. France’s support for the International Atomic Energy Agency. NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.11. 5 March 2025. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n25/060/12/pdf/n2506012.pdf#:~:text=France%20is%20one%20of%20the,Technical%20Cooperation%20Fund%20in%202025.
Russia has consistently expressed support for the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system as a reliable tool for verifying compliance by states with their Treaty obligations.
Russia reaffirmed its support for comprehensive safeguards agreements under the NPT as a reliable tool for verifying States’ compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.
National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.
https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf
National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
At the 10th NPT Review Conference in August 2022, the UK welcomed the six states that had brought Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements into force and the 14 states that had adopted Additional Protocols since 2015, called on all states that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol as soon as possible, and confirmed it was ready to provide assistance to states in bringing Additional Protocols into force.
It has done this through in-kind and financial contributions to the IAEA’s Safeguards Department and its contribution to COMPASS: Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs – State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material, and the State/regional authorities that implement safeguards domestically.
The United Kingdom has continued to encourage NPT States parties without a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to bring one into force as soon as possible. The UK states that will continue to provide support and guidance to those countries that wish to agree a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It has continued to support the IAEA Safeguards Department and the COMPASS programme.
The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of April 2023 reaffirmed support for the universal adoption of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, the Additional Protocol and where applicable the revised Small Quantities Protocol, and confirmed support for the IAEA Director General's efforts to encourage states that have yet to bring these into force to do so as soon as possible.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). Non-Proliferation Treaty 10th Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 2 issues. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/non-proliferation-treaty-10th-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-2-issues
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). The United Kingdom Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards: 2021-2024. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/678f8964c9c786c1eb788691/uk-support-programme-to-iaea-safeguards-2021-2024.pdf.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
IAEA. The IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs. https://www.iaea.org/topics/assistance-for-states/compass?__cf_chl_f_tk=82G38bWEfmFWDiUfZqcn7RfS87o2fKl0Y.GX5v9Tecc-1782835257-1.0.1.1-IdHqC5t7AVvMss5geNnd._XVCtKy2d3ADmPXchweAZo
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement, 17 April 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-april-2023/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-17-april-2023
As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and has signed the Additional Protocol.
As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and has signed the Additional Protocol.
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