United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is one of five recognized nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), having signed in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. The UK commits to the treaty’s three pillars—non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and disarmament—while maintaining a “minimum credible” nuclear deterrent of approximately 225 warheads (of which 120 are operationally available).

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The United Kingdom has pursued a range of actions in support of the disarmament objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons:

Announced reductions in its nuclear arsenal by the mid-2020s set out in its 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review

Reduce the number of warheads onboard each of our submarines from 48 to 40

Reduce the requirement for operationally available warheads to no more than 120

Reduce the number of operational missiles on the Vanguard class submarines to no more than 8

Reduce our overall nuclear weapons stockpile to no more than 180.

Promoted Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: provide expert advice in seismology and radiochemistry to help establish a viable verification regime, ready for entry into force; maintained the United Kingdom National Data Centre and hosted 13 facilities spread across the United Kingdom and our Overseas Territories, which support the International Monitoring System

Pushed for negotiations to start on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and took an active role in the 2014–2015 Group of Governmental Experts and the 2017–2018 high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group.

Stated in a joint P5 statement in 2022 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Pursued nuclear disarmament verification through UK-Norway Initiative on nuclear disarmament verification since 2007 and a second decade of an active partnership with the United States on monitoring and verification research

Signed a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (2014)

Been an active member of the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV); established a unique ‘Quad’ nuclear verification partnership in 2015 between two Non-Nuclear Weapon States and two Nuclear Weapon States; conducted the first-ever multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise known as LETTERPRESS to investigate real-life considerations related to the inclusion of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in nuclear disarmament verification

Actively participating in the “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative and welcoming the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament.

Funded projects with academia and think tanks, including the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the University of Birmingham exploring States’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons.

Hosted round tables and strategic dialogues to develop greater trust, confidence and transparency between NPT states in relation to nuclear weapons and to foster constructive global dialogue on progressing nuclear disarmament.

Supported a Middle East free of Weapons of Mass Destruction as co-convenor of the conference on the Zone.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Over the current Review Cycle the United Kingdom has:

1. Reiterated in a 2024 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
2. Supported the Pact of the Future, adopted by world leaders in October 2024, which contains the first multilateral recommitment to nuclear disarmament in over a decade.
3. Initiated a programme of work with NNWS and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament
4. Expanded its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.
5. Failed to reach agreement necessary to ratify the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone.

Sources

Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence. Cm 6994 (London: 2006).

Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2014 Update to Parliament (London, 2014).

Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2017 Update to Parliament (London, 2017).

Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2019 Update to Parliament (London, 2019).The United Kingdom’s future nuclear deterrent: the 2020 update to Parliament

Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2022 Update to Parliament (London, 2022).

Cabinet Office. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm, 7948 (London, 2010).

Cabinet Office. National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom. Cm 9161 (London, 2015)

Cabinet Office. Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103 (London), 2021.

Ministry of Defence. Defence Nuclear Enterprise: 2025 Annual Update to Parliament (London, 2025).

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 May 2012.

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 7 May 2012.

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 9 May 2012.

Ambassador Jo Adamson. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 24 April 2013.

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 26 April 2013.

Ambassador Jo Adamson. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 April 2013.

Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2014.

Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster II: Non-proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2014.

Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 5 May 2014.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document (London: 2014).

Statement by the United Kingdom. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 27 April 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 May 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee II. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 4 May 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee III. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 May 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 4 May 2017.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 May 2017.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 May 2017.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Middle East WMD Free Zone. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 April 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 26 April 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 30 April 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 1 May 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. NPT Preparatory Committee Verification Statement on behalf of ‘the Quad’ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United States .United Kingdom Delegation at the 2019 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2019.

Statement by the United Kingdom. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 August 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 August 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee II. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 8 August 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee III. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 8 August 2022.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 August 2023.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 4 August 2023.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 26 July 2024.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 July 2024.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2025.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 6 May 2025.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2015.

Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. 3 January 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61d308ffe90e071971e25654/Joint_Statement_Of_the_Leaders_of_the_Five_Nuclear-Weapon_States_On_Preventing_Nuclear_War_and_Avoiding_Arms_Races.pdf

United Nations. Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. ‘Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought: UK statement at the UN Security Council’ (New York). 18 March 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-war-cannot-be-won-and-must-not-be-fought-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council#:~:text=We%20reaffirm%20the%20P5%20leaders,maintain%20a%20minimum%20credible%20deterrent.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK stated that it strives for the greatest level of transparency in its nuclear doctrines, policies and capabilities consistent with national security and non-proliferation responsibilities, and that a world without nuclear weapons will require a multilateral framework founded on the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility.

The United Kingdom has made significant investments in a programme of work on nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) and irreversibility in nuclear disarmament (IND) with a number of partners, including the US Department of State, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The work of the United Kingdom on transparency has included discussions among the nuclear-weapon States and with non-nuclear weapon States on strategic risk reduction, to develop collective understanding.

The UK actively participated in the “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative and welcomed the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament. It has funded projects with academia and think tanks, including the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the University of Birmingham exploring States’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons. The UK has also hosted round tables and strategic dialogues to develop greater trust, confidence and transparency between States in relation to nuclear weapons and foster a more self-reflective and constructive global dialogue on progressing nuclear disarmament, including the sixth P5 Conference in London in February 2015, taking further steps on transparency.

The UK provides annual updates to Parliament on the progress of the Dreadnought Class nuclear-armed submarine programme and other related defence nuclear enterprise programmes. The United Kingdom has also published information on holdings of civil separated plutonium every year since 1986. In 1997, the UK voluntarily agreed to also publish additional information on holdings of high enriched uranium and depleted, natural and low enriched uranium in the civil nuclear cycle from 1998.

The UK reiterated at the 2022 Review Conference that “We must pursue serious work on transparency, verification and irreversibility, the three principles which underpin our collective work on disarmament. The UK has submitted working papers on each of these issues including recommendations for the Review Conference.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has played an active role in initiatives such as the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with Norway, Sweden and the United States.

The UK reiterated the central importance of applying the agreed principles of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility to any nuclear disarmament efforts, and towards the sustainability of all pillars of the NPT. It stated it remains supportive of enhanced dialogue among States parties to build a common understanding of the application of irreversibility, in its technical, legal, normative and political dimensions.

The connections between verification and irreversibility were set out by the UK in a paper for the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification in 2018. This was followed by a series of working papers and joint statements over the 2018-2022 NPT review cycle and a series of conferences funded by the UK and Norway on irreversibility and nuclear disarmament at Wilton Park at which research on the subject funded by the UK and Norway was presented. The connections between transparency, verification, irreversibility and responsibility were set out in more detail in the UK’s ‘Imagining a world without nuclear weapons: a food for thought paper’ submitted to the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

However, there are limits to UK transparency shaped by two factors: 1) a political commitment to demonstrate what it considers to be a responsible approach to its NPT commitments as a Nuclear Weapon State; and 2) a strategic commitment to protecting the operational secrecy of a small, single-system nuclear arsenal.

The UK increased its level of transparency on warhead ceilings, warhead reductions and the number of SLBMs held or deployed after the Cold War. This trend reversed in the 2021 Integrated Review marking a shift towards reduced transparency, justified by the government as necessary in a deteriorating security environment. The UK discloses very little about strategic or ‘sub-strategic’ warhead yields.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2024). Conference on Disarmament Statement by the United Kingdom. 28 May. <https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282024%29/UK_nuclear_disarmament_statement.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London).

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 5 August. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/5Aug_MCI_UK.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). UK National Report for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. February. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69a03520532c9ad91ebbcd60/UK-National-Report-for-the-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 1 issues. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-1-issues

Joint statement by Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Norway the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom (2024). Joint Statement on Irreversibility. 2024 NPT Preparatory Committee. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/24July_JointIrreversibility.pdf

Joint statement by UK, Norway and Mexico (2023). The principle of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament. 2023 NPT Preparatory Committee; https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/statements/3Aug_Irreversibility.pdf

Working Paper submitted by the UK and Norway (2021). Irreversibility in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: recommendations for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. 2020 NPT Review Conference NPT/CONF.2020/WP.16. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3949960?ln=en&v=pdf

Wilton Park (2024). Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament 2024 – Report. https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/reports/irreversibility-in-nuclear-disarmament-2024-report/

Wilton Park (2023). Moving forward on Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament. https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/app/uploads/2023/09/WP3125-Report.pdf

Wilton Park (2022). Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament. https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/app/uploads/2021/12/WP2019-Report.pdf.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026. Imagining a world without nuclear weapons: a food for thought paper. W0rking Paper 16. NPT/CONF.2026/WP.16 . 17 March. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n26/055/82/pdf/n2605582.pdf

Cabinet Office (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The UK has eliminated its arsenal of WE177 gravity bombs that were deployed on Royal Air Force and Royal Navy aircraft and helicopters. All the weapons were dismantled by August 1998 and fissile material recovered from dismantled WE177 warheads was retained for defence purposes. The UK also dismantled its final Chevaline (Polaris) warheads in April 2002 leaving Trident as the UK’s sole nuclear weapons system.

The UK has also embarked on a wide-ranging modernisation of its nuclear weapons complex and submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system since 2005. This has involved:

Construction of a new ‘Dreadnought’ class of ballistic missile submarines to deploy the Trident II (D5) SLBM following a parliamentary vote in 2007.

Participation in a US life extension programme to modernise the Trident SLBM fleet

Started work on a new A21/Mk7 ‘Astrea’ warhead to replace the current Holbrook warhead.

Investment in a suite of facilities at AWE Aldermaston and AWE Burghfield under the Nuclear Weapons Capability Sustainment Programme since 2005, including radiographic, hydrodynamics, and high-energy laser facilities, a new warhead assembly and disassembly plant, and a Future Materials Campus for the manufacture and storage of nuclear materials, improved science and analysis capabilities and processes to recover used materials.

Investment in the Technology Development Centre supporting the UK-France Teutates programme at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston (in operation since 2014) and the French Atomic Energy Commission’s Epure facility at Valduc, France, for future UK hydrodynamic and radiographic experiments.Significant investment in the Rolls Royce Raynesway site that produces submarine reactor cores for UK SSBNs and SSNs.

Significant investment in BAE Systems Barrow shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness that builds UK SSBNs and SSNs.

Significant investment in His Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde where the UK’s SSBN and SSN fleets are based including the Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) Coulport where nuclear warheads are stored and loaded onto submarines.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has not undertaken any further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed. Instead, it has increased the ceiling on its stockpile of nuclear warheads from 225 to 260 and continued the modernisation of the nuclear weapons complex and its submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system .

The UK has reiterated the necessity of nuclear weapons for the defence of the UK and its NATO allies. This was cemented in 2025 by the Labour government’s ‘triple lock guarantee’ encompassing: i) the building of four Dreadnought nuclear submarines; ii) maintaining the UK’s Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD) 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; and iii) delivering all future upgrades to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the weapon system.

The UK Initiated work on a new nuclear warhead (A21/Mk7/Astraea) to replace the current Trident Holbrook warhead “to ensure an effective deterrent for as long as required” and started work at RNAD Coulport for the introduction of new facilities to support the new warhead. It also announced plans to procure the Mark 7 aeroshell and non-nuclear components from the US under 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (made permanent in 2024) and 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement and continued its collaboration on the Trident strategic weapon system and warhead safety, security, and advanced manufacturing technologies to ensure the UK warhead remains compatible with the US Trident system.

In addition, it is widely accepted as having authorised the return of forward-deployed US B61 bombs (the modern B61-12 variant) to RAF Lakenheath, home to the US 48th Fighter Wing that operates F-15E Strike Eagle and F-35A Lightning II JSF.

The UK also stated in the 2025 SDR that it “must explore how to support the US and its NATO Allies in strengthening extended deterrence across the Euro-Atlantic” in response to the challenge posed by Russia. It will do this by “enhancing its contribution to deterrence and assurance in the Euro-Atlantic” and announced it would purchase 12 new F-35A fighter jets and join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission. The new F-35A aircraft will be based at RAF Marham and will be “available to fly NATO’s nuclear mission in a crisis”. The UK described this as the “biggest strengthening of the UK’s nuclear posture in a generation”.

Sources

Ministry of Defence. Defence Nuclear Enterprise: 2025 Annual Update to Parliament (London, 2025).

John Walker. A History of the United Kingdom’s WE 177 Nuclear Weapons Programme: From Conception to Entry into Service 1959-1980’ (BASIC, London: 2018), p. 31.

Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 4 April 1995) Column 1095W; Secretary of State for Defence. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996. Cm 3223. p. 24.

Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 30 July 1998. Column 436-37W.

Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 15 July 1992. Column 815W.

Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 22 May. 2006 Column 1329W. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060522/text/60522w0014.htm#06052325002256

Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2022 Update to Parliament (London: 2022).

Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2018 Update to Parliament (London: 2018).

Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Command 6994 (HMSO: London, December: 2006).

Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 11 March 2005. Column 1257W.

Hansard. House of Commons. Written Statement. 9 September 2009. Column 137WS.

Ministry of Defence. Memorandum from Ministry of Defence. House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base’, HC 59 (HMSO: London: 2006), p. Ev. 86.

NukeWatch. How the US Air Force brought nuclear weapons to Lakenheath air base: The inside story. 22 July 2025 https://www.nukewatch.org.uk/how-the-us-air-force-brought-nuclear-weapons-to-lakenheath-air-base-the-inside-story/
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United Kingdom is not a party to the New START treaty and has no obligations or responsibilities under the treaty. However, the UK welcomed the New START treaty and encouraged all states with nuclear weapons to continue their efforts to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals, but especially those with the largest numbers.

More broadly, the UK government recognised the contribution New START has made to international security and strategic stability by increasing transparency and mutual confidence among the two largest Nuclear Weapons States, and supported an extension of New START to 2026 in the hope and expectation that a successor agreement would be negotiated. Ultimately, this did not happen.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom encouraged Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under the treaty following Russia's decision to suspend participation in New START verification measures in 2023. Following the demise of New START in February 2026, the Labour government stated that any replacement treaty “is a matter for the US and Russia” but that the UK continues to raise nuclear arms control with the USA and Russia through the P5 process.

The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of August 2025 noted concern at Russia's suspension of its New START obligations while the treaty was in force, stated the G7's desire to seek Russia's return to full compliance with the Treaty, and called for follow-on nuclear arms control measures and reciprocal transparency regarding nuclear forces, doctrines and delivery systems.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

House of Lords Debates (2020). 28 October. cW. Russia and USA: Arms Control

https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2020-10-14.HL9204.h&s=%22New+Start%22+russia#gHL9204.r0

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2023). Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties To The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: First Session Cluster 1 Issues. 3 August.

House of Commons (2026) New START Treaty. Question for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 79349. 22 October. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-10-10/79349.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, 20 August 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

(a) See previous section

(b) The UK has not entered into bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms reduction discussions or processes. It has previously stated that UK nuclear weapons will be included in negotiations when the UK is satisfied with progress towards the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

The UK has not invited external verification of the unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal because of the absence of a wider arms control context involving reciprocal obligations from other nuclear states.

(c) The UK made a number of changes to its declaratory policy in 2010 by strengthening its negative security assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NPT NNWS unless the state is in material breach of its NPT non-proliferation obligations.

The UK declared in a joint P5 statement in 2022 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

However, UK governments have repeatedly stated that nuclear weapons remain an essential and “ultimate insurance” for national security.

(d) The UK has condemned the DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and supported UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094.

The UK has participated in the E3+3 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme; supported six UNSCRs on Iran’s nuclear programme, and negotiated the JCPOA is implementation.

The UK made a major contribution to the G8 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction and, as part of the UK’s G8 Presidency in 2013.

The UK has also expanded its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.

(e) The UK de-targeted its submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons in 1994 and ‘de-alerted’ its nuclear weapons in 1998 Strategic Defence Review to several days’ notice to fire.

(f) The UK states that its nuclear weapon command and control system is fully independent, and that the UK has full operational control over its use and only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of UK nuclear weapons.

In 1992 the UK government declared the Holbrook warhead design for its Trident SLBMs as one-point safe meaning the warhead will not produce a nuclear yield if accidentally detonated by an explosion at a single point in its conventional high explosive system.

The UK hosted the ninth P5 Conference on 12-13 February 2020 in London and led a number of expert-level P5 working groups on nuclear doctrines and risk reduction and in 2021 declared it will “champion strategic risk reduction and seek to create dialogue among states possessing nuclear weapons…to increase understanding and reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation.”

(g) The UK has funded projects on nuclear-armed states’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons.

It provides annual updates to Parliament on the progress of the Dreadnought Class submarine programme.

The UK publishes annual information on holdings of civil separated plutonium, HUE, LEU and natural uranium in the civil nuclear cycle.

The UK asked Parliament to vote in 2016 on the principle of maintaining a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence (CASD) posture and continuing with the programme to build four new SSBNs to maintain the UK’s nuclear weapons programme and won by a significant majority (472 to 117).

The UK hosted the sixth P5 Conference in London in February 2015 on further steps on transparency.

The UK has reduced transparency in 2021 by no longer providing figures for the operational stockpile, deployed warheads or deployed missile numbers “Given the changing security and technological environment.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

(a) The UK has not undertaken any further reductions in its nuclear arsenal.

(b) The UK has not addressed the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.

(c) The UK further clarified the negative security assurance set out in 2010 and reiterated in 2021, stating that it regards a material breach as referring to a State developing or attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, not safeguards or procedural issues.

The UK released a joint statement in 2022 with France and the United States further reaffirming its NPT-related positive and negative security assurances.

The UK has not taken any further steps to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

Instead, the UK has continued the modernisation of the nuclear weapons complex and submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system (see Action 3).

The current Labour government has repeated that nuclear weapons are an essential insurance and “our ultimate insurance policy that protects our freedoms and our way of life”.

The UK has increased the role and significance of nuclear weapons through its commitment in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review to purchase 12 F-35A fighter jets in order to join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission.

(d) The UK reiterated in a statement in 2024 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

The UK initiated a programme of work with NNWS and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament and participated in discussions with NWS and NNWS on strategic risk reduction.

It continued its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.

The UK continued to condemn the DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and supported relevant UNSCRs. It also continued to call on Iran to abide by its safeguards obligations under the NPT, fully cooperate with the IAEA and seek a diplomatic solution to concerns about its nuclear programme.

(e) The UK has not taken any further steps to reduce the operational status of its nuclear weapons systems.

(f) The UK has not reported specific new measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. When asked if the UK intended to commission an independent ‘failsafe’ review of the safety, security, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), and integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems following the example of the US Department of Defence, the UK Minister of State replied “We have absolute confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, but for the purpose of safeguarding national security, we will not provide detailed comment on arrangements for its assurance.”

The UK submitted a joint working paper with the US and France to the 2022 NPT Review Conference on ‘Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States’ that set out a number of steps on risk reduction to which the UK is committed.

The UK intends to use its chairing of the P5 process from mid-2025-mid-2026 to “convene substantive discussions on nuclear doctrine between the P5 states, and discuss nuclear risk reduction”.

(g) The UK has reiterated the central importance of applying the principles of

transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility to any nuclear disarmament efforts.

The UK also published the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper in 2024, which it says

provides the fullest account of the UK’s Defence Nuclear Enterprise.

The UK has refused to confirm whether or not US B61-12 nuclear bombs have been deployed

to RAF Lakenheath, stating that “remains a long-standing UK and NATO policy to neither

confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location”.

Sources

Hansard. House of Commons. 30 July 1998. Column 449 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980730/text/80730w17.htm#80730w17.html_spnew8

Hansard. House of Commons.17 December. 1998. Column 363 https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1992/dec/17/trident

Hansard. House of Commons. 18 May 2011. Column 338.

Hansard. House of Commons. 23 November 2015. Column1079.

Hansard. House of Commons. 14 July 2014. Column 573

Ministry of Defence. The UK’s nuclear deterrent: the facts (London: 2025). https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-uks-nuclear-deterrent-the-facts

Hansard House of Common. 24 January 2025. Column 1236. https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2025-01-24b.1236.0&s=%22ultimate+insurance%22#g1236.1

Hansard. House of Lords. 6 March 2023. Column 568. https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2023-03-06/debates/76A1100E-D8A2-43E7-AF69-951ABE219C67/NuclearWeaponsFailsafeReview

Gordon Brown. Speech on Nuclear Energy and Proliferation. Lancaster House. 18 March 2009. https://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2009/03/17/PMSPEECH170309.pdf

John Major. Joint Press Conference in Moscow. 15 February 1994. https://johnmajorarchive.org.uk/1994/02/15/mr-majors-joint-press-conference-in-moscow-15-february-1994/

Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Defence Review (London: 1998).

Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence. Cm 6994 (London: 2006).

Cabinet Office. Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103 (London: 2021).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 May 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 August 2022.

NukeWatch. How the US Air Force brought nuclear weapons to Lakenheath air base: The inside story. 22 July 2025. https://www.nukewatch.org.uk/how-the-us-air-force-brought-nuclear-weapons-to-lakenheath-air-base-the-inside-story/

Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad (London: 2025).

United Nations. Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. ‘Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought: UK statement at the UN Security Council’ (New York). 18 March 2024.. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-war-cannot-be-won-and-must-not-be-fought-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council#:~:text=We%20reaffirm%20the%20P5%20leaders,maintain%20a%20minimum%20credible%20deterrent.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2025.

BBC News. Call for government ‘transparency’ on nuclear bombs. 23 July 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy5w6xz7z0lo.

Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. 3 January 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61d308ffe90e071971e25654/Joint_Statement_Of_the_Leaders_of_the_Five_Nuclear-Weapon_States_On_Preventing_Nuclear_War_and_Avoiding_Arms_Races.pdf

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

Prime Minister’s Office. UK to purchase F-35As and join NATO nuclear mission as Government steps up national security and delivers defence dividend. 24 June 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-purchase-f-35as-and-join-nato-nuclear-mission-as-government-steps-up-national-security-and-delivers-defence-dividend

Royal Air Force. RAF F-35A marks a significant step in delivering a more lethal Integrated Force and joining NATO Nuclear Mission. 25 June 2025. https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/raf-f-35a-marks-a-significant-step-in-delivering-a-more-lethal-integrated-force-and-joining-nato-nuclear-mission/

H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative. Statement by the United Kingdom. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 14 March 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282024%29/UK_NSAs_statement.pdf

P3 Joint Statement on Security Assurances, 4 August 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/p3-joint-statement-on-security-assurances/

Getting to a world without nuclear weapons: a food-for-thought paper. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF.2020/WP.35 (United Nations, New York). December 10 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.35

Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States. Working paper submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF.2020/WP.70 (United Nations, New York). 29 July 2022. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/npt_conf.2020_e_wp.70.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 2016 the United Kingdom submitted a draft proposal for a programme of work and to establish an associated working group, including provisions for fissile material cut-off treaty issues. The UK stated that following the creation of five Subsidiary Bodies in 2018, four of which adopted reports by consensus, the United Kingdom, as President of the Conference on Disarmament, tabled a draft decision in March 2019 that would have taken forward this work and helped move the Conference on Disarmament closer to developing negotiating mandates on its four core agenda items. The UK stated that the decision had strong support from across the membership but was blocked by a small number of States.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In January 2025, the UK joined a consensus decision (CD/2443) to re-establish Subsidiary Body 1, which is specifically mandated to address the ‘Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament’. In high-level statements, the UK has urged all members to "re-establish the subsidiary bodies as soon as possible" to break long-standing deadlocks in the Conference. In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference the UK said it “continues to advocate for an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work within the Conference on Disarmament. Absent this, we have consistently called for the establishment of Subsidiary Bodies to advance substantive work on all agenda items of the Conference, including nuclear disarmament.”

The UK states in its statements to te CD that it supports progress through consensus-based programmes of work and that nuclear disarmament should be addressed alongside other agenda items.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Conference on Disarmament (2025). Decision on the Work of the Conference on Disarmament for 2025. Adopted at the 1740th plenary meeting on 30 January. <https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282025%29/CD.2443_%28Advance_copy%29.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2021). UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, statement at the Conference on Disarmament, 21 January. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/conference-on-disarmament-2021-session-uk-statement>.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK states that it supports progress through consensus-based programmes of work in the Conference on Disarmament. During its 2019 CD Presidency, the UK proposed establishing four Subsidiary Bodies covering the CD’s core agenda items including negative security assurances, alongside other items. The proposal committed states only to discussions rather than negotiations because the UK says it supports consensus-based progress while not committing to a legally binding instrument.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has stated in the Conference on Disarmament that it remains open to having discussions on legally-binding instruments on NSAs but that it would not be able to accept NSAs without the caveat requiring that a state not be in material breach of its obligations under the NPT.

The UK has stated that it reaffirms its existing unilateral negative security assurances regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that it updated in the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy. This stated that “The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.” It has also underscored its legally binding commitments to over 100 countries in the context of the nuclear weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Central Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

The UK has clarified the ‘material breach’ in the context of its existing NSAs refers to “a State developing or attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, not safeguards or procedural issues”.

Overall, the UK supports substantive discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances and recognises the legitimacy of efforts to develop international arrangements. However, it continues to rely on its unilateral declarations and has not committed to negotiating a universal, legally binding instrument.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2021). UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, statement at the Conference on Disarmament, 21 January. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/conference-on-disarmament-2021-session-uk-statement>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2019). Looking back at the UK’s Conference on Disarmament Presidency. FCDO Blog. https://blogs.fcdo.gov.uk/aidanliddle/2019/03/22/disarmament-blog-looking-back-at-the-uks-conference-on-disarmament-presidency/

UK Mission Geneva (2024). Conference on Disarmament. Statement by the United Kingdom by H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative Geneva, 14 March. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/UK_NSAs_statement.pdf

Cabinet Office (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy

Foreign. Commonwealth & Development Office (2024). Conference on Disarmament: High-level Segment. Statement by the United Kingdom, as delivered by Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon at the United Nations on 28 February. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-at-conference-on-disarmament-high-level-segment>

UK Mission Geneva (2024). Conference on Disarmament. Statement by the United Kingdom by H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative Geneva, 14 March. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/UK_NSAs_statement.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). UK Statement at Conference on Disarmament: High-level Segment. 28 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-at-conference-on-disarmament-high-level-segment
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK provided unilateral negative security assurances at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, committing not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT except in the case of invasion or any other attack by such a state carried out in association with a nuclear-weapon state. The UK updated its security assurances in the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy. This stated that “The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.” The UK also provided legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries through the protocols it has signed and ratified to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, as confirmed throughout the prior cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has stated that it reaffirms its existing unilateral negative security assurances regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has also underscored its legally binding commitments to over 100 countries in the context of the nuclear weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Central Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

Sources

Cabinet Office (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2024). Conference on Disarmament: High-level Segment. Statement by the United Kingdom, as delivered by Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon at the United Nations on 28 February. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-at-conference-on-disarmament-high-level-segment>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has signed and ratified protocols to four Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones treaties covering South America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, Africa, and the South Pacific, giving legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries.

It says it stands ready to sign and ratify the revised Protocol of the Treaty of Bangkok. In 2011, the UK stated that “China, France, Russia, the UK and US (the P5) and the ten member states of ASEAN, reached agreement on all the outstanding issues related to P5 signature of the Protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty”, but the UK has still not signed the protocol.

As one of the co-sponsors of the 1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East, the UK says it recognises its responsibilities and remains fully committed to a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned. Since 2019 the UK has attended all UN facilitated Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conferences as an observer.

The UK also states that it is providing expertise to the Qualified Group of Experts to study the questions of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its aspects pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 79/241.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK says it is actively engaging the Qualified Group of Experts on the question of nuclear weapon free zones, with a UK expert contributing to discussions. The UK has participated as an invited observer (as an NPT depositary state) in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction at the 3rd session (2022), 4th session (2023), 5th session (2024), and 6th session (2025).

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2011). Foreign Secretary statement on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. 29 November. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-treaty#:~:text=Foreign%20Secretary%20William%20Hague%20said,number%20of%20nuclear%20weapons%20worldwide.%E2%80%9D>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2025). Middle East WMD Free Zone Conference – November. UK National Statement. <https://app.unidir.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/Statement%20by%20United%20Kingdom%20of%20Great%20Britain%20and%20Northern%20Ireland.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK (with France) became the first NPT nuclear-weapon states to ratify the CTBT on 6 April 1998 and it has maintained its moratorium on nuclear testing since.

The UK is one of the largest financial contributors to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), providing £4.5 million annually. The UK maintains the United Kingdom National Data Centre and hosts 13 facilities spread across the UK and Overseas Territories, which support the International Monitoring System. These include 11 monitoring stations (either infrasound, hydroacoustic or radionuclide), an auxiliary seismic array and a radionuclide laboratory. These facilities are backed up by research through the Atomic Weapons Establishment forensic seismology and radionuclide team.

The UK provides technical experts, R&D and training and UK specialists contribute to CTBTO working groups and scientific development (e.g., seismic forensics at AWE Blacknest, radionuclide detection methods at GBL15).

The UK has consistently pushed for the treaty’s entry into force and hosted a P5 Experts Meeting on nuclear disarmament verification and the CTBT in April 2012. The P5 has called upon all states to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.

At the 2015 Conference on the Entry into Force of the CTBT, Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt stated that “Promoting Entry into Force of the CTBT is one of the United Kingdom’s key disarmament and non-proliferation priorities. The UK strongly supports the continued development of the Treaty’s global verification regime.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK stated at the High-Level Segment of the Conference on Disarmament in 2024 that the CTBT is an “essential treaty” and a “fundamental instrument that contributes to international security and disarmament.

The UK stated in its 2025 report to the NPT that the CTBT and its entry into force are “a vital part of the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament. The UK continues to be a vocal campaigner, including by regularly lobbying states to sign and ratify.”

The UK has continued to be one of the largest financial contributors to the CTBTO, continuing to provide extensive technical and administrative support and to maintain the UK National Data Centre and thirteen facilities spread across the world that support the International Monitoring System.

Sources

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Station Profiles. https://www.ctbto.org/our-work/station-profiles

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.

Atomic Weapons Establishment. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Monitoring. https://www.awe.co.uk/what-we-do/national-security/comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-monitoring/

Hansard. House of Commons. Written Statement, 21 May 2013. Column 71WS. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-05-21/debates/13052150000027/NuclearDisarmamentAndNon-Proliferation

Alistair Burt. UK Ministerial intervention by Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Article XIV Conference Entry into. 23 September 2011. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/uk_2011.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United Kingdom has not conducted a yield-generating nuclear weapons test since 26 November 1991. It ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1998 and is a member of the CTBT Preparatory Commission (CTBTO).

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

On Russia’s nuclear testing posture, the UK and France issued a joint statement in April 2023 expressing concern over Russia’s announcement that it would ensure its preparedness to conduct a nuclear test, and reiterating the importance of the CTBT and of Russia’s compliance with its moratorium on nuclear tests.

In November 2025 the government was asked in the House of Lords “ what assessment they have made of President Trump’s statement on 30 October regarding the testing of nuclear weapons”. The government replied that “We remain committed to our voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions, having ceased nuclear testing in 1991. The nuclear testing policy of the United States is a matter for the US Government, and it would therefore be inappropriate to comment further.”

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 25th anniversary: UK and France statement. 6 April. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-statement-on-25th-anniversary-of-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty

House of Lords (2025). President Trump: Nuclear Weapons Statement. Volume 850. 20 November. https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2025-11-20/debates/CED7F0A3-4551-4E74-A14C-BA3538E79255/PresidentTrumpNuclearWeaponsStatement
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK attended and actively participated in all Article XIV Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT throughout the prior cycle. At the 2021 Article XIV Conference, Minister Cleverly delivered the UK statement, congratulated the incoming CTBTO Executive Secretary, and called on states yet to pay their assessed contributions to do so.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK states that it fully supports the CTBT Article XIV Conferences on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT and that it has attended all of the Conferences and shall continue to do so until the Treaty enters into force.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Minister Cleverly's speech to the Article XIV Conference. 24 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-minister-cleverlys-speech-to-the-article-xiv-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1998, being one of the first two nuclear-weapon states to do so alongside France, and has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions since 1991. Throughout the prior cycle the UK provided political, technical and financial support to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and consistently called on all Annex 2 states yet to ratify the Treaty to do so.

The UK has consistently voiced support for the CTBT “as a key element of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture” and CTBTO, to which it gives substantial political and technical support. In 2021, the UK and France issued a joint statement marking the 25th anniversary of the treaty, stating they reaffirm “their strong and constant support for the universalisation and the entry into force of the CTBT, with the aim to make legally binding the voluntary moratorium which is almost universally accepted.”

The UK also stated in 2021 that it is “one of the largest financial contributors to CTBTO, providing £4.5 million annually. We provide extensive technical and political support. We maintain the UK National Data Centre and host thirteen facilities, which support the International Monitoring System.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK continued to lend full support over the current Review Cycle to the CTBT and called on all states yet to sign or ratify the CTBT to do so, through bilateral and multilateral channels.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 25th anniversary: UK and France statement. 6 April. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-statement-on-25th-anniversary-of-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 25th anniversary: UK and France statement. 6 April. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-statement-on-25th-anniversary-of-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). Underlining our support for a world without nuclear weapons. Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the Security Council briefing on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 27 September. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/support-for-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK signed the CTBT in 1996 and completed ratification in 1998, being one of the first two nuclear-weapon states to do so alongside France. The UK has not conducted any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion since 1991.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it “provides extensive technical support to the three pillars of the CTBTO’s verification framework. The UK is actively engaged in relevant work streams aimed at improving the capabilities of the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre, alongside development of the On-Site Inspection methodology. Over 90% of UK-based International Monitoring System stations are complete and operational.”

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has supported efforts to agree a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a FMCT and developed recommendations to these ends.

The UK stated in its 2010 report to the NPT that “The UK continues to press for negotiations on an FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament and is working actively with other states, including the NWS, to explore ways of moving forward”. More specifically, the UK reports it has “maintained a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices since 1995. In 1998, the UK declared the total size of its fissile material stocks and voluntarily placed all fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards. This material continues to be liable for inspection by the IAEA. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been conducted under international safeguards. However, the UK retains the right to resume such activities outside safeguards, under the terms of the UK’s Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA, until agreement is reached on an FMCT.”

The UN General Assembly met on 24 September 2010 for a high-level meeting devoted to “revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”. The UK urged countries not to block the start of negotiations on an FMCT, arguing that this is “damaging for multilateral arms control and may lead committed nations to bypass traditional institutions in order to further their disarmament ambitions”.

The UK actively participated in the 2017-18 high-level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) expert preparatory group, the 2014-15 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and in Subsidiary Body 2 of the Conference on Disarmament in 2018 and 2022 to identify issues upon which future FMCT negotiators will need to focus.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK reiterated in its 2025 report to the NPT that it “has set out publicly that nuclear disarmament requires a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that bans the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This will need a cross-regional collective effort, and the UK continues to press for negotiations on an FMCT within the CD and is working actively with other NWS and NNWS, to explore ways to move forward.”

In September 2024 12 countries including the UK launched a cross-regional group called Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to expand support for a FMCT negotiation. The ‘FMCT Friends’ comprises Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

However, the UK has not been able (or willing) to broker or lead a new successful consensus on a full, robust Programme of Work in the CD. The repeated failures of consensus reflect structural difficulties in the CD widely acknowledged by disarmament observers.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.

Leo Docherty. Minister for Europe. Statement to the Conference on Disarmament (United Nations, Geneva). 27 February 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-conference-on-disarmament-27-february-2023-minister-for-europe-statement

Statement by Mr Alistair Burt. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. High Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations (United Nations New York). 24 September 2010. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2010/statements/part3/24Sept_UK.pdf

Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. U.S> Department of State. 23 September 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/

Ambassador Jo Adamson. Statement on Revitalisation of the Conference on Disarmament by the UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (United Nations, Geneva) 14 June 2012. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2012/statements/part2/14June_UK.pdf

Ambassador Matthew Rowland. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. Statement. (United Nations, Geneva) 30 July 2023. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2013/Statements/part3/30July_UK.pdf

High-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group. Note by the Secretary-General. A/73/159 (United Nations, New York). 13 July 2018, https://docs.un.org/en/A/73/159

Group of Governmental Experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Note by the Secretary-General. A/70/81 (United Nations, New York). 7 May 2021. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/D19612093ED869EFC1257EC40033A6B3A7081.pdf

H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle. Permanent Representative. Statement by the United Kingdom. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 28 May 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282024%29/UK_nuclear_disarmament_statement.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The 1998 Strategic Defence Review declared the UK’s total stockpile of fissile material as part of its commitment to the control of fissile material. This comprised 7.6 tonnes of plutonium; 21.9 tonnes of highly enriched uranium; and 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium.

The Review stated that 4.4 tons of plutonium, including 0.3 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, and over 9,000 tonnes of non-highly enriched uranium were no longer required for defence purposes and would be now be placed under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards and made liable to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, the UK would cease exercising its right to withdraw fissile material from safeguarded stocks for nuclear weapons. The 4.4 tons of fissile material surplus to defence requirements, including 0.3 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, was transferred to the UK’s civilian plutonium stockpile.

The Review also stated that “All stocks of highly enriched uranium will, however, be retained outside safeguards, since material no longer needed for nuclear weapons will be used for the naval propulsion programme. We have considered whether further disaggregation of these totals at this time would be compatible with our continuing, if reduced, security requirement. We have concluded that it would not.”

The ‘Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium’ published by the Ministry of Defence in 2006 reiterated that “MoD HEU is held outside international safeguards for defence purposes, but is subject to a strict materials accountancy regime”.

The UK confirmed in 2010 that this material was under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards and liable to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The material is stored at the Sellafield nuclear site.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has not declared any fissile material as no longer required for military purposes in the current review cycle.

In 2025 the Labour government stated a long-term intention to immobilise all UK-owned civilian plutonium.

Sources

Ministry of Defence. Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium (London: 2006).

Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Defence Nuclear Weapons Programme: Plutonium and Aldermaston – An Historical Account (London: 2000).

Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Defence Review (London: 1998).

Ambassador John Duncan. UK Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (United Nations, New York). 21 May 2010. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-to-the-2010-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference

Michael Shanks. Plutonium Disposition Strategy. House of Commons. 24 January 2025. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2025-01-24/hcws388
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Following the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the UK placed fissile material deemed excess to defence requirements under international safeguards. This comprised 4.4 tonnes of fissile plutonium including 0.3 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, and over 9,000 tonnes of non-highly enriched uranium, placed under European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) safeguards and made liable to inspection by the IAEA. All stocks of highly enriched uranium were retained outside safeguards as material no longer needed for nuclear weapons would be used for the naval propulsion programme. The 1998 SDR stated that “We have considered whether further disaggregation of these totals at this time would be compatible with our continuing, if reduced, security requirement. We have concluded that it would not”.

The UK confirmed in 2010 that the material it had earlier placed under Euratom safeguards is liable to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency and is stored at the Sellafield nuclear site.

Following the vote in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union and Euratom, the UK developed its own State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC). As a member of the EU, the UK’s civil nuclear safeguards were carried out under Euratom, operating within a trilateral framework with the IAEA based on an agreement of 6 September 1976 agreement between the UK, Euratom and the IAEA.

On 29 March 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May formally triggered Article 50 in writing to European Council President Donald Tusk and began the two-year countdown to the UK formally leaving the EU. This was later extended until the UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020 through its European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 and entered a transition period. That period ended 31 December 2020 and the UK left the EU single market and customs union.

In 2017, May established a strict ‘red line’ as part of her government’s negotiation of a withdrawal agreement that the authority of all EU law and the European Court Justice (ECJ) in the UK must end. This meant leaving Euratom because it is governed by EU institutions and the ECJ, and the government determined the UK could not remain a member without violating this mandate.

Following this decision, a new Nuclear Safeguards Bill began its passage through Parliament in January 2018. This amended the Energy Act 2013 to give the UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) a new safeguards function to replace Euratom’s regulatory role. In June 2018 the UK signed two a new Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA to replace commitments in the 1976 trilateral arrangement between the UK, IAEA and Euroatom. The VOA was later published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/951.

The UK established two statutory instruments in 2019 to operationalise the regime ahead of EU exit day on 31 December 2020: the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Fissionable Material and Relevant International Agreements) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. These gave domestic legal effect to the new bilateral IAEA agreement and set out the UK’s nuclear material accountancy and control regime to be administered by the ONR rather than Euratom.

Throughout 2020 to 2021, the ONR continued to develop and test its material accounting system and safeguards capability, met all of the UK’s qualifying nuclear material accountancy reporting obligations, and facilitated IAEA inspections and IAEA equipment installation. From 1 January 2021 the ONR became the UK’s domestic nuclear safeguards regulator alongside its existing safety and security functions, operating under the Energy Act 2013 as amended by the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK confirmed that fissile material no longer required for defence purposes remains under international safeguards and continues to be liable for inspection by the IAEA, and that since 1995 all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been conducted under international safeguards.

However, the UK has not placed any further defence-related fissile material under international safeguard or declared any further quantities as excess to defence requirements.

Sources

Ministry of Defence (1998). The Strategic Defence Review. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-1998

Ministry of Defence (1998). The Strategic Defence Review. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-1998

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2010). UK Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. 21 May. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-to-the-2010-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2020). Office for Nuclear Regulation annual report and accounts 2019 to 2020. 29 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2019-to-2020/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2019-to-2020.

Nigel Walker (2021). Brexit timeline: events leading to the UK’s exit from the European Union. House of Commons Library. Briefing Paper 7960, 6 January. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7960/CBP-7960.pdf.

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2018). UK nuclear safeguards on track for EU exit. 9 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-nuclear-safeguards-on-track-for-eu-exit

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2019). UK national statement to the 62nd International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference. 17 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-national-statement-to-the-62nd-international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea-general-conference

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2019).EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS (EU EXIT) REGULATIONS 2019 No. 196. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/196/pdfs/uksiem_20190196_en.pdf

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2021). Office for Nuclear Regulation annual report and accounts 2020 to 2021. 13 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK does not operate any fissile material production or reprocessing facilities for nuclear weapons purposes and “ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes” in April 1995.

Production of HEU for defence programmes at the UK’s Capenhurst Plant ended in 1962. Since then the UK has received HEU for both its warhead programme and naval reactor programme through exchanges of special nuclear material with the US Department of Energy under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. In the 1960s, the plant was modified to produce Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for civil nuclear power reactors until it ceased operations in 1982.

The UK has operated three reprocessing facilities at its Sellafield nuclear site: the First Generation Reprocessing Plant (B204) from 1952 to 1964 to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for the UK’s nuclear weapon programme. It was replaced by the Magnox Reprocessing Plant (B205), which operated from 1964 to 2022. The Magnox Reprocessing Plant reprocessed spent fuel from UK Magnox nuclear reactors for civilian purposes until 2022 and for military purposes until 1995. It is now in cleanup/decommissioning. The Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) was a civil reprocessing plant that operated from 1994-2018 but did not separate plutonium for the UK nuclear weapons programme.

The Calder Hall Magnox power station at the Sellafield site consisting of four dual-purpose reactors began operations in 1956 for commercial electricity generation and plutonium production for defence needs. The Chapelcross power station in Southern Scotland operated on the same basis as Calder Hall from 1958. Following the UK government’s announcement in 1995 that it would end production of fissile material for the nuclear weapons programme, Calder Hall reactors were brought under Euratom safeguards and made liable to inspection under the terms of the safeguards agreement between the UK, Euratom and the IAEA. Calder Hall closed in 2003.

Chapelcross reactors continued to produce tritium for nuclear weapons and were not subject to international safeguards inspection. However, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review announced that all reprocessing of spent fuel from defence reactors at Chapelcross would be conducted under Euratom safeguards and made liable to inspection by the IAEA. Chapelcross ceased operations in 2004.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK is currently exploring options to re-establish a nuclear fuel cycle for reactor fuel for defence purposes, i.e. to fuel nuclear-powered submarines including nuclear-armed submarines. The UK states that such a fuel production cycle “will be consistent with the UK’s international obligations, including the NPT. It will also be consistent with the UK’s voluntary moratorium, established in 1995, on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

The UK also “retains the right to resume such activities outside safeguards, under the terms of the UK’s Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA, until negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a proposed FMCT are concluded.”

In 2024, the UK joined Japan's Friends of the FMCT initiative, which aims to facilitate political discussion of an FMCT and increase momentum towards the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.

Sources

Ministry of Defence (2000). The United Kingdom's Defence Nuclear Weapons Programme: Plutonium and Aldermaston – An Historical Account.

House of Commons (1994). Written Answers. Column 573. 19 May. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1994-05-19/debates/fbc99297-99c3-4c01-b8a8-0a97c5731fdc/ThermalOxideReprocessingPlant

Ministry of Defence (2000). The United Kingdom's Defence Nuclear Weapons Programme: Plutonium and Aldermaston – An Historical Account.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 2026. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 2026, p. 11. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United Kingdom has worked with Norway, the United States, and Sweden, UN GGEs, as well as the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and with a range of civil society organisations and academics to develop technologies and methodologies for nuclear disarmament verification and irreversibility.

The UK played an active role in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on verification, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership. The Quad, established in 2015 between Norway, Sweden, the UK and the United States, conducted the LETTERPRESS multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise in October 2017, the first ever live play exercise involving both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states in nuclear disarmament verification. Lessons from LETTERPRESS informed the Quad's subsequent workstreams on verification strategies and technologies.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership has continued its work during the current cycle, with one workstream focused on developing verification strategies and another on specific technological challenges. The UK reported that it continues to work within the Quad, the IPNDV and with civil society and academia on nuclear disarmament verification.

The UK has initiated a programme of work with non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament. At the first NPT Preparatory Committee in August 2023, the UK and Norway delivered a joint statement on the principle of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament. At the second NPT Preparatory Committee in August 2024, a joint statement on irreversibility was delivered by Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand and the UK.

The UK, in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, funded a series of Wilton Park dialogues on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament in 2022, 2023 and 2024, bringing together states parties, civil society and academics to develop shared understanding of what irreversibility means in practice in the context of nuclear disarmament.

The UK assumed the chair of the P5 Process in September 2025 and has facilitated, promoted UK participation in and funded an accompanying track II dialogue for civil society and academia from all P5 states as part of the P5 dialogue process to engage non-proliferation and disarmament experts. The government said that it was supporting two “accompanying non-government dialogues, the Expert-Level Track (ELT) and Young Professionals' Network (YPN). The purpose of these dialogues is to engage non-proliferation and disarmament experts and early career professionals from academia and think tanks in P5 countries, with the aim of generating new ideas to support the government-level process.”

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>; Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2015). Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: irreversibility statement. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-irreversibility-statement

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 19. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

House of Lords (2025). Nuclear Disarmament. Question for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. HL9730. 1 August. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-07-22/HL9730/
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has submitted regular reports on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

It submitted a report at the 2010, 2015 and 2022 NPT Review Conferences.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK submitted a draft report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference in 2025.

Sources

Ambassador John Duncan. UK Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (United Nations, New York). 21 May 2010. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-to-the-2010-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/617b0205e90e07198018fa32/UK-national-report-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-10th-review-conference.pdf

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document (London: 2021). https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2015-0154/UK_Report_Pursuant_to_the_NPT_Review_Conference.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK played an important role in finalising a standard reporting form through the P5 dialogue process. The Joint Statement of the 2014 P5 meeting in Beijing stated “welcomed the achievement under France’s leadership of P5 consensus on a reporting framework. They introduced to each other their national reports consistent with this reporting framework and Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom”.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK submitted a draft report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference in 2025 based on the standard reporting form.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/617b0205e90e07198018fa32/UK-national-report-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-10th-review-conference.pdf

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document (London: 2025). https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2015-0154/UK_Report_Pursuant_to_the_NPT_Review_Conference.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Working paper submitted by the P5. Joint statement of the P5 Beijing conference” Enhancing strategic confidence and working together to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review outcomes. Beijing, 14-15 April 2014. NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.33 (United Nations, New York) 24 April 2014. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/780595?v=pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK stated that it actively supports education, training and research on disarmament and non-proliferation through engagement with non-governmental organisations, academics and students, and through digital outreach. The UK co-sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education consistently over the past review cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK reports that it has funded 45 nuclear non-proliferation related projects since 2021 through the Counter Proliferation Programme that funds projects to strengthen political will or technical capacity to tackle the threat of weapons proliferation, including through engagement with NGOs, academics and research institutions. The UK Safeguards Support Programme also supports education through training and the provision of expertise to IAEA inspectors and analysts. The programme funds projects that strengthen political will or technical capacity to tackle the threat of weapons proliferation, including through engagement with NGOs, academics and research institutions.

The UK also states that it has supported increased public understanding on nuclear issues, including through investment in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education.

The UK stated in 2024 that it is “actively engaged in and funding a range of research and public education projects on nuclear issues including disarmament, non-proliferation and strategic stability”. It lists Ministry of Defence sponsorship of the UK Project on Nuclear Issues (UKPONI) run by the Royal United Services Institute and “transparency with the general public”.

However, no official UK government document retrieved identifies a national disarmament and non-proliferation education strategy as being in place or under development.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2021). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

UK Mission Geneva (2024). Conference on Disarmament Statement by the United Kingdom H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative Geneva, 6 June. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/2024_UK_disarmament_education_statement.pdf

Non-Proliferation

View non-proliferation actions for all countries

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK continued to press strongly for NPT universalisation and stated that it raised this with non-NPT states parties at every opportunity.

The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of April 2021 confirmed the G7's priority to promote universalisation of the NPT and called on all states to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom continued to call on all states that are not party to the NPT to sign and ratify the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states at the earliest opportunity. The UK states that it attaches great importance to the universalisation of the NPT.

The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of August 2025 called on all states that have not yet done so to accede to the NPT, and committed to working with all states to achieve a successful 2026 Review Conference.

The UK does not say what it has done to work towards this beyond making this type of statement.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group: statement 19 April 2021. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-19-april-2021/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-19-april-2021

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, 20 August 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Although not required to do so under the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state, the UK concluded a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA, signed on 7 June 2018, replacing the existing trilateral arrangements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK following the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom post-Brexit. These agreements ensure that IAEA safeguards continue to apply to all source or special fissionable material in UK civil nuclear facilities.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK continues to support the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as the NPT verification standard.

In the UK, the ONR became responsible for operating the UK SSAC under the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on 1 January 2021, met all qualifying nuclear material accountancy reporting obligations, and facilitated IAEA inspections and equipment installation, ensuring that IAEA safeguards continue to be applied to all source or special fissionable material in UK civil nuclear activities.

Sources

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018). UK nuclear safeguards on track for EU exit. 9 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-nuclear-safeguards-on-track-for-eu-exit

Statement by the United Kingdom (2025). Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2 May.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2021). Annual Report and Accounts 2020 to 2021. July. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

At the 10th NPT Review Conference in August 2022, the UK welcomed the six states that had brought Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements into force and the 14 states that had adopted Additional Protocols since 2015, called on all states that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol as soon as possible, and confirmed it was ready to provide assistance to states in bringing Additional Protocols into force.

It has done this through in-kind and financial contributions to the IAEA’s Safeguards Department and its contribution to COMPASS: Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs – State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material, and the State/regional authorities that implement safeguards domestically.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has continued to encourage NPT States parties without a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to bring one into force as soon as possible. The UK states that will continue to provide support and guidance to those countries that wish to agree a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It has continued to support the IAEA Safeguards Department and the COMPASS programme.

The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of April 2023 reaffirmed support for the universal adoption of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, the Additional Protocol and where applicable the revised Small Quantities Protocol, and confirmed support for the IAEA Director General's efforts to encourage states that have yet to bring these into force to do so as soon as possible.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). Non-Proliferation Treaty 10th Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 2 issues. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/non-proliferation-treaty-10th-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-2-issues

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). The United Kingdom Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards: 2021-2024. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/678f8964c9c786c1eb788691/uk-support-programme-to-iaea-safeguards-2021-2024.pdf.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

IAEA. The IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs. https://www.iaea.org/topics/assistance-for-states/compass?__cf_chl_f_tk=82G38bWEfmFWDiUfZqcn7RfS87o2fKl0Y.GX5v9Tecc-1782835257-1.0.1.1-IdHqC5t7AVvMss5geNnd._XVCtKy2d3ADmPXchweAZo

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement, 17 April 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-april-2023/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-17-april-2023
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK consistently addressed safeguards non-compliance throughout the prior cycle. On Iran, the UK joined France, Germany and the United States in calling on Iran to meet its safeguards obligations and provide technically credible clarifications to the IAEA. On the DPRK, the UK consistently called for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea and for it to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. On Syria, the UK urged Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve its longstanding safeguards non-compliance.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has addressed compliance with horizontal (though not vertical) non-proliferation obligations in relation to Iran’s non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement since June 2025 including through seven IAEA Board of Governors resolutions since 2020 with France, Germany and the US. The UK has also worked to ensure the comprehensive implementation of all UNSCRs relating to the DPRK and supports the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the DPRK. The UK has encouraged both the IAEA and Syria to address Syria’s outstanding non-compliance with its safeguards obligations.

In July 2025, Australia and the UK signed the bilateral Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement, known as the Geelong Treaty, providing the framework for bilateral cooperation on the design, build, operation, sustainment and disposal of the SSN-AUKUS class of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

The UK presents its cooperation under the AUKUS agreement as consistent with full compliance with non-proliferation obligations and the integrity of the safeguards system. Working with Australia and the United States, the UK has said it supports the development of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines within the framework of Australia’s safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. Its partners emphasise that Australia will not acquire nuclear weapons and that all cooperation complies with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ongoing negotiations between Australia and the IAEA under Article 14 aim to ensure continuous verification across the submarines’ lifecycle, while the UK and its partners commit to transparency, regular reporting, and close engagement with the IAEA to address compliance concerns and uphold the authority of the safeguards system.

The UK has stated that it will pursue the AUKUS programme in a way that sets a strong precedent for states seeking to develop a naval nuclear propulsion capability and that it will continue to consult with the IAEA to develop a suitable nuclear safeguards approach. The UK has said that the IAEA director-general has expressed satisfaction with the UK’s level of engagement.

However, statements made by IAEA Director-General Grossi have carefully avoided a substantive verdict on whether AUKUS meets non-proliferation standards. Statements made are procedural, in terms of confirming engagement, technical meetings, reports issued, arrangements pending, etc., rather than evaluative.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion: AUKUS update to IAEA Board of Governors, September 2025. 12 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/australias-naval-nuclear-propulsion-aukus-update-to-iaea-board-of-governors-september-2025

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

House of Lords Debates (2023). AUKUS Defence Partnership. C1436. 16 March. https://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2023-03-16c.1436.2&s=%22aukus%22%2B%22safeguards%22#g1440.0

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Nuclear safeguards: AUKUS statement to the IAEA Board of Governors. 6 March. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-safeguards-aukus-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-march-2025.

IAEA (2022). IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors. 12 September. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-12-september-2022

IAEA (2024). IAEA Director General Statement in Relation to the Agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion. 15 August. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-statement-in-relation-to-the-agreement-between-australia-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-related-to-naval-nuclear-propulsion

IAEA (2025). Naval nuclear propulsion: Australia. GOV/INF/2025/12. 12 November. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/govinf2025-12.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Throughout the prior cycle the UK consistently called on states in non-compliance with their safeguards obligations, principally Iran, the DPRK and Syria, to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues. The UK welcomed the overwhelming majority vote at the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2022 on Iran’s safeguards non-compliance, describing it as sending an unambiguous message that Iran must meet its safeguards obligations and provide technically credible clarifications to the IAEA.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom cooperates fully with the IAEA. It continues to support the IAEA’s safeguards implementation through the UK Safeguards Support Programme that provides training for IAEA inspectors, analysis of environmental samples and the provision of non-English open sources of information that could reveal indications of undeclared nuclear activities. The UK supports the resolution of safeguards non-compliance through its role on the IAEA Board of Governors, working to ensure states are fulfilling their safeguards obligations.

At the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2023, the UK, alongside France, Germany and the United States, delivered a joint statement calling on Iran to provide technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA’s outstanding safeguards questions, noting that Iran had failed to implement commitments made in its March 2023 Joint Statement with the IAEA and that the Board would need to be prepared to take further action if Iran continued to fail to meet its legal obligations.

In November 2024, the UK, France, Germany and the United States jointly proposed a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors requesting the Director General to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, noting that Iran had failed to provide technically credible information needed to resolve outstanding safeguards issues for nearly five years.

In June 2025, the UK, France, Germany and the United States brought forward a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors finding Iran in non-compliance with its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in the context of Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, following Iran’s ongoing failure to cooperate with the Agency over six years.

In November 2025, the UK, France, Germany and the United States tabled a further resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors to clarify the IAEA’s reporting mandate on Iran’s compliance with the nuclear elements of the reinstated UN Security Council resolutions, recalling Iran’s ongoing non-compliance with its legal obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement.

In March 2026, the UK, alongside France and Germany, delivered a joint statement to the IAEA Board expressing deep concern that the IAEA had been unable to access several of Iran’s nuclear facilities for more than eight months following the military interventions in June 2025, and affirming that cooperation between the Agency and Iran cannot be made conditional on factors outside legal obligations under the NPT.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). E3 and US welcome IAEA Board of Governors resolution. 8 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-and-us-welcome-iaea-board-of-governors-resolution

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). Non-Proliferation Treaty 10th Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 2 issues. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/non-proliferation-treaty-10th-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-2-issues

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Quad statement at IAEA Board of Governors, September 2023. 14 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/quad-statement-at-iaea-board-of-governors-on-the-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-september-2023

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2024. 21 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-resolution-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-november-2024

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, June 2025. 12 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-resolution-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-june-2025

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2025. 19 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-quad-statement-to-the-iaea-board-november-2025

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and UNSC resolutions in Iran: E3 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, March 2026. 5 March. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/implementation-of-the-npt-safeguards-agreement-and-unsc-resolutions-in-iran-e3-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-march-2026
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK was subject to the 1957 Euratom Treaty from joining the European Community in 1973 to leaving the European Union on 31 January 2020. All nuclear material in the UK not intended for defence purposes was subject to reporting to, and inspection by, the Euratom safeguards inspectorate during this period.

The UK signed an Additional Protocol in 1998 to the “Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. The AP enhanced the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear material within the UK by providing additional inspection powers and access to information.

Euratom is a separate body from the EU, but it is governed by the EU Commission and linked to the EU’s legal framework. This necessitated the UK’s withdrawal from it as part of the Brexit process. In order to maintain the extent and coverage of nuclear safeguards and to minimise the amount of adjustment required by UK nuclear operators the UK negotiated a new Additional Protocol with the IAEA that was signed on 7 June 2018 to replace the UK’s existing Additional Protocol to the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom. The UK then passed domestic legislation through the “Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019” to establish the UK’s domestic safeguards regime following its exit from Euratom. This enabled the UK to meet its international non-proliferation obligations, including those with the IAEA, when it came into force on 31 January 2021.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

International Atomic Energy Agency. Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/951. 12 January 2021.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/263/Add.1. International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna). 24 February 2025.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The 10th Review Conference national report confirmed that the UK considers a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an Additional Protocol, and where relevant a modified Small Quantities Protocol, to be the universal verification standard. The UK welcomed the entry into force of Additional Protocols in Benin, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the adoption of modified Small Quantities Protocols in Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Haiti and Sudan during this period, and stated that it takes every opportunity to call upon all states that have not yet done so to bring an AP or modified SQP into force as soon as possible, and was developing a support programme for states interested in doing so.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has continued to encourage NPT States parties without a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to bring one into force as soon as possible. The UK supports safeguards through direct assistance to the IAEA’s Department for Safeguards through its Member State Support Programme and bilateral assistance to any state seeking to sign, implement and ratify a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

The UK states that it provides support to states seeking to bring an Additional Protocol or modified Small Quantities Protocol into force through IAEA initiatives and direct bilateral support, including with experts from the NGO VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre). While there is clear evidence that the UK funds and participates in these activities, publicly available evidence linking UK assistance to specific state adoptions of APs or mSQPs remains limited.

The UK has reiterated that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an Additional Protocol is the universal verification standard under the NPT that the UK wants to see universalised during the current cycle, and stated that it will remain one of the largest IAEA extrabudgetary contributors on safeguards to this end.

At the 69th IAEA General Conference in September 2025, the UK called on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with an Additional Protocol as the NPT verification standard, and to update or rescind their Small Quantities Protocols.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great . Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 21. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>. For example, VERTIC (2024). TECHNICAL WORKSHOP ON PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IN LAO PDR. January. https://www.vertic.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/VM34-Safeguards-Legislation-Case-Studies-Lao-PDR.pdf.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 2 issues. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-2-issues

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). 69th IAEA General Conference: UK national statement. 15 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iaea-general-conference-2025-climate-minister-speech
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The NPT does not require the United Kingdom to have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as a nuclear-weapon state. However, the UK does have a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA and all civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to UK safeguards and to the terms of the UK/IAEA safeguards agreements.

The UK concluded a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA on 7 June 2018 to replace the existing trilateral arrangements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK following the UK's withdrawal from Euratom post-Brexit. These agreements ensured that the IAEA retained its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and continue to receive current safeguards reporting.

The UK Voluntary Offer Agreement (INFCIRC/951) applies safeguards to nuclear material in civil nuclear facilities designated by the IAEA and empowers the IAEA to inspect civil nuclear facilities, ensuring that international verification of the UK's safeguards activity remains robust. The Additional Protocol grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and locations of the UK's civil nuclear assets above and beyond the Voluntary Offer Agreement.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In August 2024, the UK presented to Parliament updated treaty texts of both the Voluntary Offer Agreement and the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, confirming the continued application of IAEA safeguards to UK civil nuclear material under INFCIRC/951and its Additional Protocol.

The 11th Review Conference national report confirms that all civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to UK safeguards under the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and to the terms of the UK/IAEA Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol, with the ONR operating the UK SSAC and meeting all IAEA reporting obligations.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018). UK nuclear safeguards on track for EU exit. 9 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-nuclear-safeguards-on-track-for-eu-exit

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020). Civil Nuclear Safeguards. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-agreements-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-without-a-deal/civil-nuclear-safeguards

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). UK/IAEA: Agreement for Application of Safeguards in Connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [TS No.56/2024]. August. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66c4a6fed10184fe9b13e44f/TS_56.2024_UK_IAEA_Agreement_Application_Safeguards_Non-Proliferation_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). UK National Report for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. February. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69a03520532c9ad91ebbcd60/UK-National-Report-for-the-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

This action is not applicable because the United Kingdom, as a declared nuclear-weapon state, does not use the IAEA Small Quantities Protocols, as these are only for non-nuclear-weapon states with minimal nuclear material.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

This action is not applicable because the United Kingdom, as a declared nuclear-weapon state, does not use the IAEA Small Quantities Protocols, as these are only for non-nuclear-weapon states with minimal nuclear material.

Sources
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK Safeguards Support Programme 2016–2021 contributed to IAEA safeguards assessment and evaluation through provision of technical expertise, analytical laboratory services, training for IAEA inspectors and analysts, and cost-free experts to the IAEA Department of Safeguards, all aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system.

The UK supported the IAEA Board of Governors decisions on integrated safeguards and the State-Level Concept throughout this period. The 10th Review Conference national report confirmed the UK's commitment to strengthening the safeguards system through universalisation of the Additional Protocol and support to IAEA safeguards implementation.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK supports the IAEA’s efforts to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system. The UK Safeguards Support Programme has contributed to this effort. The UK states that from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2025, the UK Safeguards Support Programme provided just under £8m of in-kind and financial contributions to over 35 tasks within the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification.

The UK is supporting the IAEA in addressing safeguards challenges posed by small modular reactors (SMRs), recognising that without robust oversight their global deployment could raise proliferation risks. Through the IAEA’s “Safeguards by Design for SMRs” initiative, the UK Safeguards Support Programme has partnered with Rolls-Royce SMR in March 2024 to provide technical expertise, assess safeguards implications of SMR designs, explore implementation strategies, and identify design modifications to facilitate effective safeguards. This collaboration, supported by UK government funding and industry participation, demonstrates the UK’s commitment to strengthening international safeguards and enabling the safe, secure, and peaceful deployment of advanced nuclear technologies worldwide.

Sources

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2022). UK support programme to IAEA safeguards 2016–2021. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/633a94e1e90e0772dc9651b5/uk-support-programme-to-iaea-safeguards-2016-2021.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK Safeguards Support Programme provided continuous political, technical and financial support to the IAEA throughout the prior cycle. The UK is one of the largest extrabudgetary contributors to the IAEA and consistently paid its Technical Cooperation Fund contributions in full and on time throughout this period.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has continued to provide political, technical and financial support to the IAEA over the current review cycle. This includes inspector training, network laboratories for the analysis of environmental sampling, provision of open-source information relevant to safeguards, provision of technical experts, and support to IAEA responses to potential future challenges such as Small Modular Reactors.

The UK states that “From 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2025, the UK Safeguards Support Programme provided just under £8m of in-kind and financial contributions to the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification”.

The UK has also provided targeted financial support to the IAEA in response to the Ukraine crisis. The UK provided a total of £5 million to the IAEA to support its work in Ukraine since Russia's invasion, including £750,000 announced in June 2023 to support IAEA nuclear safety missions, training in detection of radiological materials and expert investigative missions to nuclear power plants.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), p. 22. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). Ukraine: UK boosts funding to International Atomic Energy Agency. 8 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukraine-uk-boosts-funding-to-international-atomic-energy-agency
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK Safeguards Support Programme established in 1981 has provided continuous technical support to the IAEA in developing and maintaining the international technology base for safeguards. The programme provides expertise and advice for the further development of safeguards strategies in new and existing activities, analytical services to support the IAEA in analysing nuclear material from safeguards inspection samples, access to facilities and experts for training IAEA personnel in advanced techniques, and development of techniques and methods for safeguarding facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has continued to provide support to the IAEA's international technology base through its Safeguards Support Programme.

Sources

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). UK nuclear safeguards support programme: reports on activities and progress. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-safeguards-support-programme-report-on-activities-and-progress

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK provides standing secretarial support to the Zangger Committee and regular technical expertise to the NSG through its Technical Experts Group. The UK participates fully in the NSG's information exchange groups and uses meetings of the NSG Consultative Group to share best practice and national experience in implementing the NSG guidelines.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it continues to abide by its export control commitments under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in line with the NSG and ZC control lists. It continues to provide standing secretarial support to the Zangger Committee and regular technical expertise to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and uses meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Consultative Group to share best practice and national experience in implementing the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

The UK's national export control framework is underpinned by the Export Control Order 2008, which has been amended during the current cycle. The Export Control (Amendment) Regulations 2025, which came into force on 20 May 2025, amended the Export Control Order 2008 and the assimilated Dual-Use Regulation to update controls on nuclear materials, facilities and equipment in line with changes agreed under the NSG guidelines. A second set of amendments came into force on 16 December 2025.

This ensures that the UK's export control regime remains aligned with international non-proliferation standards to prevent UK exports from contributing to nuclear weapons programmes and supporting implementation of NPT Articles I, II and III, as envisaged by Action 35.

The UK Strategic Export Control List, derived from and routinely updated in line with changes to the control lists administered by the multilateral export control regimes including the NSG, was most recently updated in December 2025.

The UK has also fully implemented UNSCR 1540 since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As a vice-chair of the 1540 Committee, the UK works with states, the IAEA and the G7 Global Partnership to monitor and assist implementation.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 25. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Department for Business and Trade (2025). UK Strategic Export Control Lists. December. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69415ba1f065108822537524/uk_export_control_list_2025.pdf

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2021). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK's national export control framework implements the control lists and guidelines of the NSG and the Zangger Committee. Both the Zangger Committee and the NSG were established by nuclear suppliers including the UK to coordinate their nuclear supply policies in order to comply with the NPT and other commitments to nuclear non-proliferation.

In 2019, the UK reviewed its interpretation of the NSG guidelines and strengthened its controls on re-export of UK items already abroad through the ongoing exchange of government-to-government assurances.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom’s national framework has continued to implement the control lists and guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

The UK welcomed the publication in November 2025 of an update to the Zangger Committee's Trigger List. The UK also updated its guidance for the UK nuclear industry in February 2024 to set out the reporting requirements to ensure compliance with its Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and other safeguards obligations, as well as import and export requirements.

The UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2024 states that the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero provides advice on NSG-related matters, ensuring that any additional documentation required from other governments is secured in advance of providing recommendations on export licence applications involving nuclear items.

Sources

Department for Business and Trade (2025). International non-proliferation and arms control regimes. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/international-non-proliferation-and-arms-control-regimes

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero / Department for Business and Trade (2025). UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2024. July. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687910bc7ea2091686363947/UK_Strategic_Export_Controls_Annual_Report_2024.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK's export control framework has consistently required that nuclear exports only proceed where IAEA safeguards obligations are in place. The Zangger Committee Trigger List, to which the UK subscribes, requires the export of listed items to trigger IAEA safeguards obligations in the recipient state.

In 2008, the UK revised its policy on nuclear exports to India following the NSG waiver for India. Nuclear-related exports to India are permitted only under the NSG India exception and only for civil facilities safeguarded by the IAEA. Applications for items destined for unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion, continue to be refused. This policy is reflected in the UK-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, concluded in 2015, and in the current guidance on importing and exporting nuclear-related items.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom says that it supports universal adoption of IAEA safeguards and that it “assesses all export licence applications fully and in accordance with Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines before a final decision is made for any licence application”. The UK also welcomed the publication in November 2025 of an update to the Zangger Committee's Trigger List, which requires IAEA safeguards to be triggered by exports of listed nuclear items.

Export control policy states that the UK will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, inter alia, the UK’s obligations under the NPT or the UK’s commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

However, the UK’s India-specific guidance also says nuclear-related exports to India are permitted only under the NSG India exception and only for civil facilities safeguarded by the IAEA.

Sources

Department for Business and Trade (2025). International non-proliferation and arms control regimes. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/international-non-proliferation-and-arms-control-regimes

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2024). Importing and exporting nuclear-related items: role of NCAs between the UK and international partners. February. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65d31e920f4eb1f5bba98118/nuclear-cooperation-agreements-guidance.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2024 (2025). House of Commons HC 1251. July 17, p. 53. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687907f70263c35f52e4dda2/UK_Strategic_Export_Controls_Annual_Report_2024_Accessible.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK's 10th Review Conference national report confirmed the UK's commitment to ensuring that other countries benefit from the UK's expertise and experience through full participation in bilateral and multilateral fora, as well as providing financial support to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has been a consistent supporter of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and states that it recognises “the inalienable right of NPT States parties to the development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as set out in the NPT.” Transfers of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes are enabled through the UK’s export licensing system in alignment with the Nuclear Suppliers Group framework. The UK states it would only refuse an export licence application if the intended transfer would be inconsistent with its export licensing framework.

The UK emphasises that cooperation for peaceful uses should be attentive to the Global South requirements across health, agriculture, water and energy and go beyond technology transfer to include capacity-building, skills development and institutional readiness.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>, p. 25.

United Kingdom (2026). Good Practice in International Collaboration on Peaceful Uses and Non-Proliferation. Working Paper submitted to the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2026/WP.8. 2 March.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK's 10th Review Conference national report confirmed the UK's strong record of cooperation with other States parties to support the exchange of civilian nuclear technology for power and non-power related applications in a manner that minimises the risks of proliferation, through full support to the IAEA's Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation Fund contributions.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom says that it has “a strong record of cooperation with other States parties, to support the exchange of civilian nuclear technology (for power and non-power related applications) which minimises the risks of proliferation. The UK continues to provide full support to the IAEA through our Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation (TC) Fund contributions and recognises the important work that the IAEA does in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology.”

The UK is a voluntary donor to the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), which supplements the TC Fund with flexible funding. This supports rapid-response and high-priority projects, including pandemic-related diagnostics and zoonotic disease monitoring, as well as enabling technology transfer and training in developing states beyond the core TC budget.

The UK is working with the IAEA and under the UK and US led Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU) to remove barriers to access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. The UK reports that the SPDU has engaged nearly 1,500 participants from over 96 countries leading to over 35 project concepts and multiple feasibility studies being taken forward.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 July 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/second-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-review-conference-to-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-statement-on-pillar-3.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>, p. 39.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

At the 3rd IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in February 2020, the UK stated that it remained entirely committed to the highest standards of nuclear security at home and around the world, strongly supported the IAEA’s role in coordinating global efforts, and confirmed a further contribution of £1.6 million to the Nuclear Security Fund. The UK confirmed that its detection architecture prevents the trafficking of radioactive materials and that it was trialling and using the latest detection technologies at its borders and inland.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it maintains the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities through a security regime for its civil nuclear industry that is “recognised as world leading – it is robust, effective and meets international standards”.

The UK also reports that it has supported nine successful IAEA Resolutions relating to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the threat to nuclear safety and security posed by Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

The ONR Corporate Plan 2025-26 confirmed that priorities for cyber security are aligned to the 2022 Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy, with the ONR maintaining enhanced focus on cyber security and completing in-depth assessment of the industry’s risk management and cyber protection capabilities.

Sources

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020). UK national statement to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security. 10 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-national-statement-to-the-iaea-international-conference-on-nuclear-security

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 31. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2025). Corporate Plan 2025 to 2026. June. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-corporate-plan-2025-to-2026/office-for-nuclear-regulation-corporate-plan-2025-to-2026
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United Kingdom participated actively in the Nuclear Security Summit process (2010–2016) through submission of national progress reports, supporting strengthened international nuclear security architecture, and promoting implementation of IAEA nuclear security recommendations.

The UK has supported international nuclear security capacity-building, for example through the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and training, peer review, and advisory missions, for example through International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

The UK states that it is the second largest Member State contributor to the IAEA’s extra-budgetary Nuclear Security Fund and has donated over £10 million to the fund over the past five years.

The UK shares expertise and best practice through a range of international fora including IAEA conferences and committees, the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (FTPRNT), the G7 Global Partnership and the Insider Threat Symposium.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom’s legislation on civil nuclear security (Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR)) and nuclear industry security requirements overseen by the UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation are explicitly aligned with the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225).

The ONR states that the UK was the first nuclear weapons state to receive an IPPAS mission in 2011 and the first to request a follow-up mission in 2016. The ONR supports and regularly contributes team leaders and experts to lead or participate in IPPAS missions to other countries, promoting the identification of good practices and facilitating mutual learning to improve standards internationally.

The ONR has produced Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) for the civil nuclear industry, replacing the earlier National Objectives, Requirements and Model Standards (NORMS). SyAPs continue the move to outcome-focused regulation for security and place more emphasis on mitigating emerging threats including cyber security and information assurance.

Sources

National Statement by the United Kingdom (2016). Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, D.C. April 1. https://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/national-statement-united-kingdom

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>, p. 27.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), p. 27. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions. https://www.onr.org.uk/working-with-others/international/iaea-international-physical-protection-advisory-service-ippas-missions

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs). https://www.onr.org.uk/operational/security/syaps/
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM) in 2010. The UK committed to implementing and universalising nuclear security conventions, including the ACPPNM, sharing best practice and expertise with international partners, and supporting global nuclear security assistance.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has called on all states that have not yet done so to ratify the ACPPNM and to implement its provisions fully, as part of its broader approach to strengthening the international nuclear security framework.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The Export of Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006 controls the export of certain high-activity radioactive sources as defined under the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It was introduced as part of the UK government’s international commitment to minimise the risk of radioactive sources falling into the hands of terrorists or criminal groups, and establishes a licensing requirement for Category 1 and Category 2 radioactive sources.

The UK policy framework for managing radioactive substances and nuclear decommissioning was published in May 2024 and confirmed the UK’s written political commitment to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and to the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, and states that the UK follows the principles set out in the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has made a written political commitment with respect to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and with respect to the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources. The UK states that it follows the principles set out in the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

The UK implements the Code through the following legislation: the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR) (England and Wales); Radioactive Substances Act framework (Scotland) and Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR).

The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) follow-up mission in January 2024 observed that while the UK government had implemented the objectives of the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources in practice, it had not yet formally notified the IAEA of its commitment to this Guidance. The mission noted that after conducting an internal consultation to confirm this would not create any additional constraints, the UK had not yet completed the formal notification process.

Sources

Department for Business and Trade (2025). Controls on radioactive sources. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controls-on-radioactive-sources

Department of Trade and Industry (2006). Explanatory Memorandum to the Export of Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1846/pdfs/uksiem_20061846_en.pdf.

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2024). Managing radioactive substances and nuclear decommissioning: UK policy framework. May. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6632371769098ded31fca7c1/managing-radioactive-substances-and-nuclear-decommissioning-uk-policy-framework.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). Report of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Follow-up Mission to the United Kingdom. October. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6704ee5fc71e42688b65f294/irrs-report-2024-to-uk.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Programme Cyclamen, the UK's radiological and nuclear border detection system, has been in continuous operation since 2003. The Home Office described it as the UK's primary defence against the illicit importation of radiological and nuclear materials, sitting alongside wider detection and response capabilities that make up the UK's domestic nuclear security system and form part of the government's Nuclear Security Strategy and CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom says that it has deployed radiological and nuclear detection capabilities at its borders and inland through Programme Cyclamen, specialist response capabilities to protect and prepare against an attack using these materials, and a robust regulatory framework to protect nuclear materials.

The UK participates in international nuclear security architectures, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and INTERPOL-linked efforts to detect illicit trafficking.

The UK has established specialist response and investigative capacity, including counter-terrorism policing structures and nuclear/radiological incident response capabilities coordinated across the Office for Nuclear Regulation, Civil Nuclear Constabulary and counter-terrorism units.

The UK has continued to invest in the Cyclamen Programme with a contract worth up to £300 million covering fixed, vehicle-based and mobile radiological and nuclear detection capability at ports and airports around the UK and one site in northern France, running to 2034.

The UK's Counter-Terrorism Strategy CONTEST 2023 sets out the aim of reducing the risk from terrorism, including from radiological and nuclear threats, through detect, prepare, prevent and pursue strands of activity.

The UK says it is “committed to the continued implementation and universalisation of nuclear security conventions, sharing best practice and expertise with international partners, and supporting global nuclear security assistance”.

Sources

Home Office (2024). Cyclamen Programme. 6 August. https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Notice/024659-2024.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Home Office (2024). Cyclamen Programme. 6 August. https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Notice/024659-2024

Home Office (2023). CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023. CP 902. July. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/650b1b8d52e73c000d54dc82/CONTEST_2023_English_updated.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>, p. 26.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2009.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has continued to call on all states that have not yet done so to ratify ICSANT and to implement its provisions fully, as part of its broader approach to strengthening the international nuclear security framework.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The most significant prior-cycle development under Action 46 was the establishment of the UK’s own State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) following withdrawal from Euratom post-Brexit. In preparation for leaving Euratom, the ONR recruited and trained new safeguards staff, developed a regulatory framework for the new domestic regime, and developed a Safeguards Information Management and Reporting IT system to receive, process and submit nuclear material accountancy information from operators to the IAEA.

On 1 January 2021, the ONR became responsible for the UK’s new domestic safeguards regime, delivering the UK SSAC when the associated legislation came into force. Throughout 2020 to 2021, the ONR continued to develop and test its material accounting system and safeguards capability, met all of the UK’s qualifying nuclear material accountancy reporting obligations, and facilitated IAEA inspections and IAEA equipment installation.

The ONR’s implementation of the new regime was positively assessed, with the UK SSAC operating successfully and enabling the UK to meet all its international safeguards obligations and deliver all required reports on time under the UK’s Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/951) and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The IAEA’s annual safeguards review for UK safeguards implementation stated that ONR’s first year performance had exceeded their expectations.

The UK also supported the IAEA’s own safeguards programmes through its Safeguards Support Programme. The UK Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards 2016–2021 delivered training events to IAEA inspectors, analysts and senior staff, including courses utilising UK expertise and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle, and provided cost-free experts to the IAEA Department of Safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom is responsible for its own nuclear safeguards arrangements as a nuclear weapon State. It states that it has “an established and robust nuclear safeguards regime (UK SSAC), designed to meet our international obligations on safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation.” The SSAC was established after the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom and is designed to meet its obligations under the UK’s Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/951) and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The post-Brexit legal framework is set out in the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 and the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

The UK reports that “in 2022, a French authority peer review of the UK SSAC found the UK safeguards legal and regulatory frameworks to be structured, comprehensive and coherent, noting several areas of good practice”.

The UK Safeguards Support Programme 2021-2024 continued to provide technical support to the IAEA in verifying the peaceful use of nuclear technology, delivering £5 million in in-kind and financial contributions to over 35 tasks within the IAEA Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme.

Sources

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2020). Office for Nuclear Regulation annual report and accounts 2019 to 2020. 29 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2019-to-2020/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2019-to-2020.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2021). Office for Nuclear Regulation annual report and accounts 2020 to 2021. 13 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). Office for Nuclear Regulation: post-implementation review 2022 – full report. 4 October. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-onr-post-implementation-review/office-for-nuclear-regulation-post-implementation-review-2022-full-report-html

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). Office for Nuclear Regulation: post-implementation review 2022 – full report. 4 October. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-onr-post-implementation-review/office-for-nuclear-regulation-post-implementation-review-2022-full-report-html

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department of Trade and Industry (2006). Explanatory Memorandum to the Export of Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1846/pdfs/uksiem_20061846_en.pdf.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). UK nuclear safeguards support programme: report on activities and progress 2021 to 2024. 21 January. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/678f8964c9c786c1eb788691/uk-support-programme-to-iaea-safeguards-2021-2024.pdf

Peaceful Uses

View peaceful uses actions for all countries

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the UK reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States Parties to access the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that they are in compliance with their obligations, and stated its readiness to assist states in the development of safe and secure civil nuclear energy.

The 10th Review Conference national report (2021) confirmed that the UK is committed to ensuring that other countries benefit from the UK’s expertise and experience, and that the UK’s internationally integrated civil nuclear industry operates across the full nuclear lifecycle, providing facilities and services for enrichment, chemical conversion, fuel production, generation, decommissioning, waste management and research.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom routinely reaffirms the inalienable right of NPT States parties to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as set out in the NPT in NPT statements. The UK states that it “supports States parties freedom to develop, produce and benefit from a range of power and non-power applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department of Trade and Industry (2006). Explanatory Memorandum to the Export of Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1846/pdfs/uksiem_20061846_en.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has an internationally integrated civil nuclear industry operating across the nuclear lifecycle, providing facilities and services for enrichment, chemical conversion, fuel production, generation, decommissioning, waste management and research. In 2021, the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed by the UK with Australia, Canada, the US and Euratom came into force. In 2019, the UK reviewed its interpretation of the NSG guidelines and strengthened its controls on re-export of UK items already abroad through the ongoing exchange of government-to-government assurances.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom cooperates with other NPT States parties to support the exchange of civilian nuclear items (for power and non-power related applications) in line with NPT obligations and the NSG framework. The UK supports exchange through the IAEA’s Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation (TC) Fund and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The UK has consistently reaffirmed the right of States parties to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty. The UK continues to explore Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with other partners where it would be mutually beneficial, and supports the exchange of civil nuclear items through the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and contributions to the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK committed to ensuring that other countries benefit from the UK’s expertise and experience through full participation in bilateral and multilateral fora, including through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme and the Peaceful Uses Initiative. The UK plays an active role in multilateral organisations including the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, the Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy Future initiative, the Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA. The UK’s National Nuclear Laboratory and the Institute for Global Food Security were both designated as IAEA Collaborating Centres in 2020.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has promoted cooperation with and between NPT member states to increase access to peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, including through the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses launched with the US in 2022 (SDPU), the Sapporo 5 to expand civil nuclear capabilities and reduce dependency on Russian nuclear fuel supply, the Nuclear Energy Association, and the Global Tripling Nuclear Pledge. The UK has reaffirmed the right of States parties to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty.

At the first NPT Preparatory Committee in August 2023, the UK stated its commitment to expanding access to the benefits of peaceful uses, enabling more countries to benefit from nuclear technologies, particularly those that contribute to the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses partnered with the Water Authority of Jordan, the Ministry of Health of Ghana and stakeholders in the Philippines, holding events in Amman and Accra.

At the second NPT Preparatory Committee in August 2024, the UK confirmed that the Sustained Dialogue promotes international cooperation and aims to widen participation in peaceful uses of nuclear technology for development purposes, bringing together policy makers, the development community, scientific experts, the private sector and the IAEA. In its first two years, the Sustained Dialogue focused on advancing water security in the Middle East and North Africa, improving outcomes for cancer patients in West Africa, and tackling food insecurity in Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

At the G7 Leaders’ meeting at COP28 in December 2023, the UK joined other G7 nations in supporting a global aspirational goal of tripling nuclear energy capacity from 2020 by 2050, recognising nuclear energy’s potential to provide affordable low-carbon energy that can reduce dependence on fossil fuels and ensure global energy security.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2023). Civil nuclear fuel cooperation between Canada, France, Japan, United Kingdom and United States: statement, December 8. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-fuel-supply-multilateral-alliance-between-uk-and-international-partners/civil-nuclear-fuel-cooperation-between-canada-france-japan-united-kingdom-and-united-states-statement

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 3 issues. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-3-issues.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2024). Second Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: UK statement on Pillar 3. 22 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/second-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-review-conference-to-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-statement-on-pillar-3

Prime Minister’s Office (2023). G7 Leaders’ Statement: 6 December 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-leaders-statement-6-december-2023
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK’s Export Control Act 2002 and Export Control Order 2008 provide an updated legal framework for the UK to restrict exports that could be used for nuclear weapons, including dual-use items and related technology. Exporters must obtain a license from the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) for any controlled export. The UK uses its export control legislation to implement the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and fulfill its NPT obligation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The effect is that non-NPT states without comprehensive safeguards (India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea) are ineligible for UK nuclear exports. This constitutes a structural mechanism to ensure ‘preferential treatment’ for NPT parties.

India is an exception following the 2008 statement on civil nuclear co-operation with India by the NSG. This provides an exception from the NSG guidelines for exports to civil nuclear facilities in India that are safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The UK subsequently reviewed its policy towards nuclear-related exports to India. In 2010, the UK and India signed a Civil Nuclear Co-operation Declaration. The licensing policy to India was reviewed in 2010 in the Written Ministerial Statement by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Alistair Burt. This resulted in the 2017 UK/India: Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

In addition, the UK and Pakistan, which is not a member of the NPT, regularly discuss the peaceful uses of nuclear technology during their bilateral Dialogue on Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament. These dialogues allow both countries to exchange views on the topic, but they are not part of a civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear cooperation.

The UK currently has a Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear cooperation with Australia, Canada, China, Czechia, Euratom, Finland, India, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Russia, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, and the US.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has continued its current practice and signed a number of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear cooperation since leaving the European Union and Euratom over the current NPT review cycle, but none with developing countries.

Sources

Alistair Burt. Ministerial Statement. UK Civil Nuclear Trade Policy (India). House of Commons. 29 November 2010. https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2010-11-29/debates/1011294000012/UKCivilNuclearTradePolicy%28India%29

Communication dated 10 September 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the Agency regarding a ‘Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India’. INFCIRC/734 (IAEA, Vienna). 18 September 2008. https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/communication-dated-10-september-2008-received-permanent-mission-germany-agency-regarding-statement-civil-nuclear-cooperation-india

UK/India: Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. TS No.1/2017 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London). 12 January 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ts-no12017-ukindia-agreement-for-co-operation-in-the-peaceful-uses-of-nuclear-energy

Louisa Brooke-Holland. An introduction to UK arms exports (House of Commons LIbrary, London). 24 January 2024. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8312/CBP-8312.pdf

Department for Energy and Net Zero and the Office for Nuclear Regulation. Importing and exporting nuclear-related items and the role of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements between the United Kingdom and international partners. 2024https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65d31e920f4eb1f5bba98118/nuclear-cooperation-agreements-guidance.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the UK reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States Parties to access the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that they are in compliance with their obligations, and stated its readiness to assist states in the development of safe and secure civil nuclear energy.

The UK's 10th Review Conference national report set out the breadth of its engagement on nuclear technology transfer during the prior cycle. The UK confirmed that it has an internationally integrated civil nuclear industry operating across the nuclear lifecycle, providing facilities and services for enrichment, chemical conversion, fuel production, generation, decommissioning, waste management and research. The UK plays an active role in multilateral organisations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, including through the International Framework for Nuclear Energy, the Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy Future initiative, the Nuclear Energy Association, and the IAEA.

In 2021, the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed by the UK with Australia, Canada, the US and Euratom came into force, with administrative arrangements consistent with the UK's obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. In 2019, the UK reviewed its interpretation of those guidelines and strengthened controls on re-export of UK items already abroad through the ongoing exchange of government-to-government assurances.

The UK's National Nuclear Laboratory and the Institute for Global Food Security were both designated as IAEA Collaborating Centres in 2020, with the NNL partnership focused on developing nuclear fuels and technologies of the future, and the IGFS collaboration advancing the global food security agenda.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has reiterated that it recognises the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as set out in the NPT, and would only refuse an export licence application if the intended transfer would be inconsistent with its export control obligations. The UK ran an industry training seminar in May 2024 for UK industry participants involved in nuclear exports, providing information on international obligations and commitments, nuclear safeguards and reporting, regulatory frameworks and how licensing works in practice.

The UK continues to explore Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with other partners where it would be mutually beneficial, and is working closely with the IAEA on the potential growth of new reactor types including SMRs.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2015). The United Kingdom remains committed to the Non Proliferation Treaty. 27 April. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-united-kingdom-remains-committed-to-the-non-proliferation-treaty

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

At the 60th IAEA General Conference in 2016, the UK set out its position on the effectiveness of the Technical Cooperation Programme, stating that it needed to support the right projects, with clear justification, realistic programmes and achievable and sustainable long-term goals delivering real benefits, and that projects should be properly monitored across their lifetime and fully evaluated to identify lessons learned.

At the 61st General Conference in 2017, the UK welcomed the Secretariat's continued implementation of the Results-Based Management approach and encouraged the Secretariat and Member States to assess project outcomes and implement lessons learned.

At the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2020, the UK paid its TCF target in full and on time and called on other Member States to do the same, noting that full and timely payment minimises constraints on the effectiveness of the Agency's development projects. The UK also encouraged the IAEA to do more to support Least Developed Countries in accessing a higher percentage of the TC Fund, and announced the establishment of the first ever UK-IAEA Collaborating Centre based on cooperation with the National Nuclear Laboratory.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom supports the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme and the results-based management approach the IAEA is taking to ensure its effectiveness.

At the 66th IAEA General Conference in September 2022, the UK confirmed its participation in the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses, alongside 30 other partners, aiming to expand access to nuclear technologies through medical, environmental and energy applications.

At the second NPT Preparatory Committee in August 2024, the UK reported that in its first two years the Sustained Dialogue had focused on advancing water security in the Middle East and North Africa, improving outcomes for cancer patients in West Africa, and tackling food insecurity in Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Sources

UK Mission to the UN in Vienna (2016). UK Statement to the 2016 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference. 28 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-to-the-2016-international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea-general-conference.

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2017). UK Statement to the 61st General Conference of the IAEA. 19 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-the-61st-general-conference-of-the-iaea.

UK Mission to the UN in Vienna (2020). UK statement on Technical Cooperation to the IAEA Board of Governors. 15 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-on-technical-cooperation-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2022). UK National Statement to the IAEA 66th General Conference 2022. 26 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-national-statement-to-the-iaea-66th-general-conference-2022.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2024). Second Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: UK statement on Pillar 3. 22 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/second-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-review-conference-to-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-statement-on-pillar-3
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has engaged in peaceful nuclear cooperation and supported developing countries in the uses, safety and security of nuclear technology for medicine, agriculture and power. This has been channelled through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) programme or bilateral aid.

The UK reported that it has paid its Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation Fund contributions to the IAEA in full and on-time and made significant extra-budgetary contributions to support the refurbishment of the Seibersdorf laboratories, and in support of the IAEA’s nuclear safety and security programmes which underpin the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The UK reported in 2018 that it made a £4.1M contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

The UK reported that it plays an active role in multilateral organisations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, including through the International Framework for Nuclear Energy (IFNEC), the Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy Future initiative, the Nuclear Energy Association, and the IAEA. The UK’s national report to the 2022 NPT Review Conference set out in more detail the projects it has funded through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) on Sterile Insect Technique, Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL), Covid-19 response, Marine plastics, and the Marie Skłodowska Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP).

The UK states that it has continued to support the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) launched in 2010 through its contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), to which it has contributed more than £20 million and more than £6 million in extra-budgetary contributions since 2020. This includes work on marine plastic pollution, isotope hydrology and environmental protection.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK states that it has continued to support the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) launched in 2010 through its contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), to which it has contributed more than £20 million to the TCF and more than £6 million in extra-budgetary contributions since 2020. This includes work on marine plastic pollution, isotope hydrology and environmental protection. The UK also committed £1 million to Atoms for Food projects to boost food security and tackle global hunger in November 2024.

The UK is also part of a group of States Parties who have come together to initiate a new Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU) since 2022. We believe that States Parties can break new ground by working together to: bring in new voices and perspectives from across different specialisms; drive global awareness of how nuclear technology can address development challenges; and identify new opportunities for peaceful uses assistance. In February 2025, the UK delivered a Nuclear Dialogue in Kenya, convening regulators, civil society organisations and international experts to facilitate knowledge exchange on nuclear regulation and stakeholder engagement in Africa.

Sources

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 6 May 2025.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 1 May 2018.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK paid its Technical Cooperation Fund contributions in full and on time throughout the prior cycle, with specific amounts confirmed in successive IAEA General Conference statements. At the 60th IAEA General Conference in 2016, the UK pledged over €3 million to the Technical Cooperation Programme. At the 61st General Conference in 2017, the UK pledged more than €3.6 million to the Technical Cooperation Fund, noting its record of paying voluntary contributions on time and in full, and called on other Member States to do the same. At the 62nd General Conference in 2018, the UK pledged €3.7 million to the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2019, confirming it would continue to pay on time and in full. At the 65th General Conference in 2021, the UK pledged over €4 million to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has paid its IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund contributions in full and on time to ensure predictability of resources and encourages other states to do the same. At the 66th IAEA General Conference in September 2022, the UK pledged £3.4 million to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2018). UK National Statement to the IAEA 62nd General Conference 2021. 18 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-national-statement-to-the-62nd-international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea-general-conference

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2016). UK statement to the IAEA international conference on nuclear security. 6 December. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-the-iaea-international-conference-on-nuclear-security.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK National Statement to the IAEA 65th General Conference 2021. 22 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-national-statement-to-the-iaea-65th-general-conference-2021

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2016). UK statement to the IAEA international conference on nuclear security. 6 December. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-the-iaea-international-conference-on-nuclear-security.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has been a consistent and substantial extrabudgetary contributor to IAEA activities throughout the prior review cycle. On nuclear security, in March 2016 the UK made a contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund of £7.1 million, encouraging other IAEA Member States to provide funds and expertise to support the IAEA in the field of nuclear security. This built on earlier contributions: in 2014 the UK Government made an extrabudgetary contribution of £3.4 million to the Nuclear Security Fund, making the UK the second largest Member State contributor to the Fund at that time. On the Technical Cooperation Fund, the UK has consistently paid its voluntary contributions in full and on time throughout this period.

On safeguards specifically, the UK Safeguards Support Programme established in 1981 has provided continuous technical and financial support to the IAEA’s verification work. The programme provides technical support to the IAEA in verifying the peaceful use of nuclear technology, including through the provision of expert staff to complete specialised programmes of work.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom makes significant extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities through mechanisms such as UK Safeguards Support Programme, the Peaceful Uses Initiative and contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.

The UK contributes to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme and the Peaceful Uses Initiative. In 2023, the UK contributed more than £5 million to projects including the modernisation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Applications laboratories at Seibersdorf, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme, work on marine plastic pollution, and projects on the impact of climate change on water availability. In 2024, the UK contributed more than £5 million to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme and Peaceful Uses Initiative, funding projects to monitor changes in atmospheric processes as evidence of climate change, research to assess the impacts of climate change on food security, and projects to address marine plastic pollution.

At the 69th IAEA General Conference in September 2025, the UK confirmed contributions of over £1.2 million to the Agency’s Atoms4Food initiative and stated that it remains one of the largest annual contributors to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.

Through the UK Safeguards Support Programme, the UK provided £5 million in in-kind and financial contributions to over 35 tasks within the IAEA Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification during 2021 to 2024.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK provided a total of £5 million to the IAEA to support its work in Ukraine, including an additional £750,000 announced in June 2023 to support IAEA nuclear safety missions, training in detection of radiological materials, and expert investigative missions to nuclear power plants.

Sources

Department of Energy and Climate Change (2014). UK statement to the 2014 International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, 24 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-the-2014-international-atomic-energy-agency-general-conference

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2017). UK Statement to the 61st General Conference of the IAEA, 19 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-the-61st-general-conference-of-the-iaea.

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). UK nuclear safeguards support programme: reports on activities and progress, 21 January. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-safeguards-support-programme-report-on-activities-and-progress.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 3 issues. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-3-issues.

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). 69th IAEA General Conference: UK national statement. 16 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iaea-general-conference-2025-climate-minister-speech.

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). The United Kingdom Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards: 2021-2024. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/678f8964c9c786c1eb788691/uk-support-programme-to-iaea-safeguards-2021-2024.pdf.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2023) Ukraine: UK boosts funding to International Atomic Energy Agency. 8 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukraine-uk-boosts-funding-to-international-atomic-energy-agency.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has a long-standing national framework for nuclear skills development. In 2016, the UK published its National Nuclear Skills Strategic Plan, a government-industry collaboration covering the full nuclear market.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom continues to invest in national nuclear skills through its Nuclear Skills Plan launched in 2024 as a collaborative programme between government and industry. The UK also supports IAEA initiatives like the Marie Curie Sklodowska Fellowship Programme, and the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC), which improve skills and development in the nuclear sector.

The UK also supports IAEA initiatives that develop international nuclear skills capacity, including the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme and the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre. In May 2024, the UK ran a training seminar for UK industry involved in nuclear exports covering international obligations, nuclear safeguards and reporting, regulatory frameworks and licensing supporting workforce literacy on the UK's international commitments as well as technical skills.

Sources

Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (2016). Launch of National Nuclear Skills Strategic Plan unites sector on skills as it embarks upon renaissance, 1 December. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/launch-of-national-nuclear-skills-strategic-plan-unites-sector-on-skills-as-it-embarks-upon-renaissance

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 25. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

After Brexit the UK established an independent domestic nuclear safeguards regime. The Office for Nuclear Regulation took over responsibility for domestic safeguards from Euratom, and the UK signed new international agreements with the IAEA to replace the existing trilateral arrangements. As part of the same process, the UK concluded a number of bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements to maintain continuity of civil nuclear trade under international safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it ensures that “civil nuclear cooperation is used to encourage others to adhere to safeguards implementation. For example, when we discuss Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and MoUs with third countries, we raise the importance of the AP. We also encourage any countries who have not yet signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to enter into talks with the IAEA to do so”.

On new reactor designs, the UK states that it is working closely with the IAEA to ensure safeguards are designed into new reactor types such as SMRs from the outset

On AUKUS, the UK states that its cooperation with Australia to build nuclear-powered attack submarines is in line with its international obligations under the NPT and IAEA. The UK IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material under an Article 14 arrangement, which will include verification measures to enable the IAEA to continue to meet its technical safeguards objectives throughout the submarines’ lifecycle.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 33<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 23. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In March 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a UK-proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance, co-sponsored by the EU, Russian Federation and United States. The NFA is a contractual arrangement designed to assure the continued supply of nuclear fuel to a country should its supply be disrupted for political reasons, with the IAEA as co-signatory.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has been a supporter of multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The UK is a member of the grouping of five G7 nuclear nations (Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) known as the ‘Sapporo 5’, formed in April 2023 on the margins of the G7 Energy Ministers’ meeting in Japan. The Sapporo 5 resolved to promote public-private investment in enriched uranium production capacity free from Russian material, and to establish a resilient global uranium supply market free from Russian influence and the potential to be subject to political leverage. By September 2024, the group announced it had mobilised $5.6 billion to establish a global commercial nuclear fuel supply chain, exceeding the initial $4.2 billion target committed at COP28. The UK says it is investing up to £300m with industry to establish a UK High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) supply chain to fuel next-generation Advanced Modular Reactors and provide a commercial supply from 2031.

There is no indication the Nuclear Fuel Assurance process has been taken forward. It is not mentioned in the 2022 or 2026 UK NPT national reports and the IAEA’s description of the NFA remains static.

Sources

IAEA. Nuclear Fuel Assurance. n.d. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-fuel-assurance

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2023). Civil nuclear fuel cooperation between Canada, France, Japan, United Kingdom and United States: statement. 8 December. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-fuel-supply-multilateral-alliance-between-uk-and-international-partners/civil-nuclear-fuel-cooperation-between-canada-france-japan-united-kingdom-and-united-states-statement

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2024). Civil nuclear fuel cooperation: statement on investments for nuclear fuel security. 19 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-nuclear-fuel-cooperation-statement-on-investments-for-nuclear-fuel-security.

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2026). Statement on civil nuclear fuel use. 4 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-nuclear-fuel-use-statement/statement-on-civil-nuclear-fuel-use.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK became a Party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1996, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in 1990, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in 1990, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2001, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2009, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1991 and to its amendment in 2010.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK committed to implementing and universalising nuclear security conventions, sharing best practice and expertise with international partners, and supporting global nuclear security assistance. It made annual contributions to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund totalling over £15 million from 2017 to 2020, and worked to enhance nuclear security globally through its Global Nuclear Security Programme.

The UK hosted the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission in 2019 to assess UK adherence to the IAEA’s safety standards with a follow-up in 2024. The UK supports activity to enhance nuclear security globally through the Global Nuclear Security Programme and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it consistently supports “the sharing of best practice in the area of nuclear safety and security including through IAEA peer reviews and the publication of mission team reports.”

The UK has provided support and assistance to countries looking to develop and enhance their civil nuclear security through its Global Nuclear Security Programme and Nuclear Threat Initiative's Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security.

In February 2025, the government announced an independent Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce to review the UK's civil and defence nuclear regulatory framework. The review had a broad scope covering legislation, regulator scope and resource capacity, regulatory outcomes, nuclear sector culture and processes, and innovation and new nuclear. The Taskforce published its final report in November 2025, setting out 47 recommendations for the government to speed up the delivery of nuclear projects at lower cost and on time.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, 5 November.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 27. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

United Kingdom (2026). Nuclear Regulatory Task Force. Working Paper submitted to the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2026/WP.9. 2 March.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration completed the transfer of around 700kg of HEU from the UK’s Dounreay site to the US in 2019. This was publicly announced as a non-proliferation commitment and is the most significant UK civilian HEU minimisation action of the prior cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it has reduced its holdings of Highly Enriched Uranium (uranium enriched to 20% or higher – Highly Enriched Uranium) since 2017 from 1214kg to 637kg in 2024.

The UK also committed in 2026 that all civil nuclear reactors in the UK are to be fuelled by uranium enriched to less than 20% U-235.

Sources

Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (2019). US and UK complete project to remove highly enriched uranium. 3 May. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/us-and-uk-complete-project-to-remove-highly-enriched-uranium.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2026). Statement on civil nuclear fuel use. 4 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-nuclear-fuel-use-statement/statement-on-civil-nuclear-fuel-use.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK published guidance in 2021 on its regulatory framework for radioactive and civil nuclear safety, confirming that the UK develops specific transport regulations based on international agreements and IAEA safety standards, and that the ONR is the enforcing authority for the civil transport of radioactive material by road, rail and inland waterway.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that “UK industry, regulators and Civil Nuclear Constabulary continue to be world leaders in the security of transport of nuclear material.”

Nuclear Transport Solutions, the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s (NDA) specialist transport subsidiary, has partnered with the IAEA in a three-year collaboration to enhance nuclear and radioactive material transport security globally. This collaboration aims to strengthen research, develop training materials and deliver global capacity-building workshops, with a focus on technical support, nuclear security culture, computer security and physical protection.

The Merchant Shipping (Nuclear Ships) Regulations 2022, which came into force in December 2022, established requirements for communication between nuclear ships and coastal states, including a requirement for the master of a nuclear ship to immediately inform the appropriate maritime authorities of the coastal state in whose waters the ship operates in the event of a damaged condition, addressing Action 62’s specific requirement on communication between shipping and coastal states.

Sources

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2021). How we regulate radiological and civil nuclear safety in the UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-we-regulate-radiological-and-civil-nuclear-safety-in-the-uk/how-we-regulate-radiological-and-civil-nuclear-safety-in-the-uk-webpage

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (2025). NDA Business Plan 2025 to 2028. June. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-decommissioning-authority-business-plan-2025-to-2028/nuclear-decommissioning-authority-business-plan-2025-to-2028

Department for Transport (2022). The Merchant Shipping (Nuclear Ships) Regulations 2022. SI 2022/1169. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1169
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United Kingdom is Party to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention) and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Brussels Supplementary Convention). These are implemented domestically through the Nuclear Installations Act 1965.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK acceded to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, on 1 January 2026. The enabling legislation is contained in the Energy Act 2023 and The Nuclear Installations (Compensation for Nuclear Damage) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, which updated the Nuclear Installations Act 1965.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Written Statement by Lord Vallance (2025). The United Kingdom’s Accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). House of Lords. 13 October. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2025-10-13/hlws939
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK did not conduct or plan attacks on civilian nuclear facilities in the prior review cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it “recognises the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.”

In 2022 the ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and senior officials from Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the USA, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy expressed their express “grave concern regarding the threats posed to the safety and security of nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes in Ukraine and their personnel, significantly raising the risk of a nuclear accident”. They underscored the importance of the IAEA Director General’s ‘Seven Indispensable Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security’, outlined in his statement to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 2 to 3, 2022 and welcomed the IAEA’s Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ).

In contrast, the UK has not condemned military attacks by Israel and the United States on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025 and 2026. Instead, it has only acknowledged in a joint statement with France and Germany that it was not involved in the 2025 attacks and a statement by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer that the UK was not involved in the 2026 attacks. The UK has acknowledged military strikes in the vicinity of Iranian nuclear infrastructure has not explicitly operationalised or cited the 2009 IAEA General Conference prohibition in its public statements, instead relying on general non-proliferation, de-escalation, and self-defence framing.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022) Safety and security of civil nuclear facilities in armed conflicts: joint statement. 21 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-safety-and-security-of-civil-nuclear-facilities-in-armed-conflicts-21-september-2023

France, Germany and the UK (2025).NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: E3 Statement to the IAEA Board of Governors. 10 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-e3-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-september-2025

Prime Minister’s Office (2026). PM statement on Iran: 28 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-iran-28-february-2026.

United Kingdom

Disarmament

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Non-Proliferation

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