France has been actively involved in efforts to solve proliferation crises, in particular with regards to Iran and the DPRK.
On Iran, it has been involved as part of the E3 in pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the crisis but also implementing sanctions at the UN and EU level in reaction to Iran non-compliance to its non-proliferation obligations. This involvement led to the adoption of the JCPOA in 2015. It has remained active on this file as part of the E3 following the unravelling of the JCPOA. In particular, the E3 triggered the JCPoA’s dispute resolution mechanism in January 2020. In 2020 and 2021, they engaged in talks with the aim of restoring the JCPoA and returning the United States to the deal.
With regard to the DPRK, France has been actively condemning the withdrawal of the country from the NPT, which it considers illegal. It has voted consistently at the UN Security Council to condemn key nuclear developments, in particular nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. It has supported the Panel of Experts established to monitor sanctions taken against the DPRK in accordance with various UN resolutions. At the 2019 Preparatory Committee, it sponsored a joint statement on the North Korean nuclear challenge.
Since 2022, France has continued its involvement as part of the E3 to try and restore the JCPOA and convince Iran to implement its obligations. In July 2025, the E3 offered a one-time snapback extension provided that Iran agreed to resume direct and unconditional negotiations with the United States, return to compliance with its legally binding safeguards obligations, and address its high enriched uranium stockpile. In August 2025, they officially notified the UN of their intent to reinstate sanctions due to Iran’s “clear and persistent non-performance” of its commitments. These sanctions are part of the “snapback mechanism” described under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which was adopted to implement the JCPOA in 2015. On 19 September 2025, France voted against preserving sanctions exemption at the UN Security Council. On 28 September 2025, the snapback was officially activated by France, Germany and the UK and the three countries have been working since on the re-imposition of the various sanction regimes and attempting to put in place a sanction monitoring committee.
France has continued to oppose, at the highest level, North Korea’s nuclear programme, including at the UN Security Council. France has spoken out against Russia’s decision to block the renewal of the mandate of the DPRK sanction Panel of Expert. At the 2024 Preparatory Committee, it sponsored a joint statement underlining the urgency and stakes of this proliferation crisis and organised a side-event in cooperation with South Korea and the Philippines. At the 2025 Preparatory Committee, France cosponsored another side-event on the DPRK’s nuclear challenge with South Korea.
Activation of the snapback – Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the UK (28 September 2025), France Diplomacy, 28 September 2025, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/activation-of-the-snapback-joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
Statement by Mr Nicolas De Rivière, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Security Council, (translation from French), New York, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 13 July 2023, https://onu.delegfrance.org/france-will-not-resign-itself-to-north-korea-becoming-a-nuclear-state
Addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge, Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/13, 13 May 2019, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/13
Conclusion of the 2nd Preparatory Committee of the NPT, Permanent Representation of France to the Conference of Disarmament, 14 August 2024, https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conclusion-of-the-2nd-Preparatory-Committee-of-the-NPT
Russia participated in negotiation and implementation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme, which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).
Russia has supported UN Security Council resolutions demanding that the DPRK act in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement since 2006.
Russia has taken a part in finding a political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, including through the Six-Party Talks held between 2003 and 2009. Russia has developed and promoted a roadmap towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula together with China in 2017.
Russia stated that it will continue to promote the earliest possible agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, taking into account Iran’s legitimate rights under the NPT
Russia continues to advocate a political and diplomatic settlement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
The UK consistently addressed safeguards non-compliance throughout the prior cycle. On Iran, the UK joined France, Germany and the United States in calling on Iran to meet its safeguards obligations and provide technically credible clarifications to the IAEA. On the DPRK, the UK consistently called for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea and for it to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. On Syria, the UK urged Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve its longstanding safeguards non-compliance.
The United Kingdom has addressed compliance with horizontal (though not vertical) non-proliferation obligations in relation to Iran’s non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement since June 2025 including through seven IAEA Board of Governors resolutions since 2020 with France, Germany and the US. The UK has also worked to ensure the comprehensive implementation of all UNSCRs relating to the DPRK and supports the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the DPRK. The UK has encouraged both the IAEA and Syria to address Syria’s outstanding non-compliance with its safeguards obligations.
In July 2025, Australia and the UK signed the bilateral Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement, known as the Geelong Treaty, providing the framework for bilateral cooperation on the design, build, operation, sustainment and disposal of the SSN-AUKUS class of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
The UK presents its cooperation under the AUKUS agreement as consistent with full compliance with non-proliferation obligations and the integrity of the safeguards system. Working with Australia and the United States, the UK has said it supports the development of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines within the framework of Australia’s safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. Its partners emphasise that Australia will not acquire nuclear weapons and that all cooperation complies with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ongoing negotiations between Australia and the IAEA under Article 14 aim to ensure continuous verification across the submarines’ lifecycle, while the UK and its partners commit to transparency, regular reporting, and close engagement with the IAEA to address compliance concerns and uphold the authority of the safeguards system.
The UK has stated that it will pursue the AUKUS programme in a way that sets a strong precedent for states seeking to develop a naval nuclear propulsion capability and that it will continue to consult with the IAEA to develop a suitable nuclear safeguards approach. The UK has said that the IAEA director-general has expressed satisfaction with the UK’s level of engagement.
However, statements made by IAEA Director-General Grossi have carefully avoided a substantive verdict on whether AUKUS meets non-proliferation standards. Statements made are procedural, in terms of confirming engagement, technical meetings, reports issued, arrangements pending, etc., rather than evaluative.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion: AUKUS update to IAEA Board of Governors, September 2025. 12 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/australias-naval-nuclear-propulsion-aukus-update-to-iaea-board-of-governors-september-2025
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
House of Lords Debates (2023). AUKUS Defence Partnership. C1436. 16 March. https://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2023-03-16c.1436.2&s=%22aukus%22%2B%22safeguards%22#g1440.0
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Nuclear safeguards: AUKUS statement to the IAEA Board of Governors. 6 March. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-safeguards-aukus-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-march-2025.
IAEA (2022). IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors. 12 September. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-12-september-2022
IAEA (2024). IAEA Director General Statement in Relation to the Agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion. 15 August. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-statement-in-relation-to-the-agreement-between-australia-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-related-to-naval-nuclear-propulsion
IAEA (2025). Naval nuclear propulsion: Australia. GOV/INF/2025/12. 12 November. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/govinf2025-12.pdf
The United States’ annual “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies its own compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. In every annual Compliance Report published prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States has self-certified full compliance with its NPT and broader arms control and non-proliferation obligations.
The United States’ annual “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies its own compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. In every annual Compliance Report published during the current Review Cycle, the United States has self-certified full compliance with its NPT and broader arms control and non-proliferation obligations.
U.S. Department of State. “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.” [Annual reports index page.] https://www.state.gov/adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/.