China
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Sources
France
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
In addition to policies taken in the implementation of action 26 with regard to the question of Iran’s compliance with its safeguards, France has also raised its concern with regard to Syria’s implementation of its safeguards agreement (Dayr Al-Zawr site).
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
In addition to policies taken in the implementation of action 26 with regard to the question of Iran’s compliance with its safeguards, France has also continued to raise its concern with regard to Syria’s implementation of its safeguards agreement (Dayr Al-Zawr site).
Sources
National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
Russia
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
Russia provided support to the IAEA’s safeguards implementation, including through its national safeguards support programme, and contributed to resolution of safeguards non-compliance through its role on the IAEA Board of Governors and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council
Russia supported a series of IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council resolutions linked to DPRK nuclear and missile programmes and the Iranian nuclear programme
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Russia continued to provide support to the IAEA’s safeguards implementation, including through its national safeguards support programme and contribute to resolution of safeguards non-compliance through its role on the IAEA Board of Governors and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council
Sources
National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.
https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf
National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
United Kingdom
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
Throughout the prior cycle the UK consistently called on states in non-compliance with their safeguards obligations, principally Iran, the DPRK and Syria, to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues. The UK welcomed the overwhelming majority vote at the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2022 on Iran’s safeguards non-compliance, describing it as sending an unambiguous message that Iran must meet its safeguards obligations and provide technically credible clarifications to the IAEA.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
The United Kingdom cooperates fully with the IAEA. It continues to support the IAEA’s safeguards implementation through the UK Safeguards Support Programme that provides training for IAEA inspectors, analysis of environmental samples and the provision of non-English open sources of information that could reveal indications of undeclared nuclear activities. The UK supports the resolution of safeguards non-compliance through its role on the IAEA Board of Governors, working to ensure states are fulfilling their safeguards obligations.
At the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2023, the UK, alongside France, Germany and the United States, delivered a joint statement calling on Iran to provide technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA’s outstanding safeguards questions, noting that Iran had failed to implement commitments made in its March 2023 Joint Statement with the IAEA and that the Board would need to be prepared to take further action if Iran continued to fail to meet its legal obligations.
In November 2024, the UK, France, Germany and the United States jointly proposed a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors requesting the Director General to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, noting that Iran had failed to provide technically credible information needed to resolve outstanding safeguards issues for nearly five years.
In June 2025, the UK, France, Germany and the United States brought forward a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors finding Iran in non-compliance with its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in the context of Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, following Iran’s ongoing failure to cooperate with the Agency over six years.
In November 2025, the UK, France, Germany and the United States tabled a further resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors to clarify the IAEA’s reporting mandate on Iran’s compliance with the nuclear elements of the reinstated UN Security Council resolutions, recalling Iran’s ongoing non-compliance with its legal obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
In March 2026, the UK, alongside France and Germany, delivered a joint statement to the IAEA Board expressing deep concern that the IAEA had been unable to access several of Iran’s nuclear facilities for more than eight months following the military interventions in June 2025, and affirming that cooperation between the Agency and Iran cannot be made conditional on factors outside legal obligations under the NPT.
Sources
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). E3 and US welcome IAEA Board of Governors resolution. 8 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-and-us-welcome-iaea-board-of-governors-resolution
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). Non-Proliferation Treaty 10th Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 2 issues. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/non-proliferation-treaty-10th-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-2-issues
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Quad statement at IAEA Board of Governors, September 2023. 14 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/quad-statement-at-iaea-board-of-governors-on-the-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-september-2023
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2024. 21 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-resolution-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-november-2024
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, June 2025. 12 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-resolution-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-june-2025
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2025. 19 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-quad-statement-to-the-iaea-board-november-2025
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and UNSC resolutions in Iran: E3 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, March 2026. 5 March. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/implementation-of-the-npt-safeguards-agreement-and-unsc-resolutions-in-iran-e3-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-march-2026
United States
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The United States’ annual “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies other countries’ non-compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.
Prior the current Review Cycle, the United States pushed for activating formal noncompliance mechanisms with regards to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. On certain occasions, the United States pushed for referral of these respective cases to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.
In 2018, however, the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Iran subsequently stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA on a step-by-step basis until, on 23 February 2021, it stopped implementing them altogether, including the Additional Protocol. This disruption has made it significantly more challenging to assess the complete nature of Iran’s non-compliance.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
The United States’ annual “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies other countries’ non-compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.
During the current Review Cycle, the United States has coordinated joint statements stressing the necessity that Iran and Syria return to compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, and urging both countries to cooperate with the IAEA. The United States has also co-sponsored or supported several IAEA Board of Governors resolutions calling on Iran to provide the IAEA with the information needed to address undeclared nuclear material.
Sources
U.S. Department of State. “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.” [Annual reports index page.] https://www.state.gov/adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/.
Poblete, Yleem D. S. “A Crisis of Compliance: The Cases of Syria and Iran.” U.S. Department of State, 2018. https://2017-2021.state.gov/a-crisis-of-compliance-the-cases-of-syria-and-iran/.
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. “Remarks at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” U.S. Department of State, May 3, 2010. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/05/141424.htm.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Director General. “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).” Report to the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, GOV/2025/50. IAEA, September 3, 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2025-50.pdf.
U.S. Department of State. “The IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran.” June 10, 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-iaea-board-of-governors-resolution-on-iran/.
U.S. Department of State, France, Germany, United Kingdom. “Quad Joint Statement on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran.” November 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/quad-joint-statement-on-the-iaea-board-of-governors-resolution-on-iran.