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Pillar 2

Action 30

The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The following agreements have been adopted to place relevant French installations under safeguards, according to the specificies of nuclear-weapon states:

  • Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) between France, Euratom and the IAEA of July 27, 1978 (INFCIRC/290) in force since 12 September 1981
  • Additional Protocol (AP) of 22 September 1998 (INFCIRC/290/Add.1) in force since 30 April 2004
  • Safeguards Agreement for the Caribbean French territories of 21 March 2000 (INFCIRC/718) in force since 26 October 2007, together with the modifications on the Small Quantities Protocol of 17 September 2017, in force since 25 February 2019.

From 2013 to 2022, between 15 and 23 IAEA inspections were conducted annually on 17 eligible installations.

As per EURATOM agreements, financial and personnel costs linked to inspections are covered by EURATOM members.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In 2023 and 2024, the IAEA and the French government indicated that 10 inspections had taken place in France. Discussions are ongoing with the IAEA on the possibility of placing additional French civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections.

Sources

EURATOM and IAEA Safeguards in France: Current Situation and Future Challenges, INMM ESARDA 2023 – Paper ID 237, 2023.

International safeguards implementation in France, Working paper submitted by France, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.12, Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 4 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.12

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Russia’s Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA entered into force in 1985 and allows the IAEA to apply safeguards to designated nuclear material within its civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that more than 40 nuclear facilities in its territory are listed as those to which the IAEA safeguards could be applied

Sources

The Text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, INFCIRC/327, 1 July 1985

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc327.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The NPT does not require the United Kingdom to have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as a nuclear-weapon state. However, the UK does have a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA and all civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to UK safeguards and to the terms of the UK/IAEA safeguards agreements.

The UK concluded a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA on 7 June 2018 to replace the existing trilateral arrangements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK following the UK's withdrawal from Euratom post-Brexit. These agreements ensured that the IAEA retained its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and continue to receive current safeguards reporting.

The UK Voluntary Offer Agreement (INFCIRC/951) applies safeguards to nuclear material in civil nuclear facilities designated by the IAEA and empowers the IAEA to inspect civil nuclear facilities, ensuring that international verification of the UK's safeguards activity remains robust. The Additional Protocol grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and locations of the UK's civil nuclear assets above and beyond the Voluntary Offer Agreement.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In August 2024, the UK presented to Parliament updated treaty texts of both the Voluntary Offer Agreement and the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, confirming the continued application of IAEA safeguards to UK civil nuclear material under INFCIRC/951and its Additional Protocol.

The 11th Review Conference national report confirms that all civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to UK safeguards under the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and to the terms of the UK/IAEA Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol, with the ONR operating the UK SSAC and meeting all IAEA reporting obligations.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018). UK nuclear safeguards on track for EU exit. 9 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-nuclear-safeguards-on-track-for-eu-exit

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020). Civil Nuclear Safeguards. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-agreements-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-without-a-deal/civil-nuclear-safeguards

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). UK/IAEA: Agreement for Application of Safeguards in Connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [TS No.56/2024]. August. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66c4a6fed10184fe9b13e44f/TS_56.2024_UK_IAEA_Agreement_Application_Safeguards_Non-Proliferation_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). UK National Report for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. February. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69a03520532c9ad91ebbcd60/UK-National-Report-for-the-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

As part of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the United States provides the IAEA with a list of all of its civil nuclear facilities, excluding only facilities with direct national security significance. In 1980, the United States submitted a list of more than 200 eligible facilities, and the IAEA is notified whenever a change to the list takes place. In 2009, the United States made its list public, but following public controversy, removed it from official government websites.

Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

As part of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the United States provides the IAEA with a list of all of its civil nuclear facilities, excluding only facilities with direct national security significance.

Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5209.htm.

Obama, Barack. “The List of Sites, Locations, Facilities, and Activities Declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Message from the President transmitting the U.S. Additional Protocol declaration to Congress, House Document 111–37, 111th Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office, May 6, 2009. https://fissilematerials.org/library/us09.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “The International Atomic Energy Agency.” https://2021-2025.state.gov/iaea/.