France has supported developments of the IAEA safeguards system, defending in particular the implementation of state-level approaches. IAEA has started to implement a state-level approach to apply safeguards in France in 2020.
France has continued to support developments of the IAEA safeguards system, defending in particular the implementation of state-level approaches. France’s contribution to the IAEA regular budget was around 3.7% in 2025. 39% of the IAEA’s regular budget in 2026 is devoted to safeguards implementation.
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42
Scale of Assessment of Member States’ Contributions towards the Regular Budget for 2026, GC(69)/RES/6, 17 September 2025, https://www.iaea.org/gc69/gc69res6
Russia has consistently expressed support to the IAEA’s efforts to ensure the reliability and improve the effectiveness of its verification mechanism and supported relevant IAEA General Conference decisions.
Russia advocated that in any reforms, the IAEA safeguards system must continue to be objective, depoliticized, technically sound and consistent with the safeguards agreements concluded between States and IAEA and that the presumption of innocence and respect for the sovereignty of States should underpin IAEA activities in implementing safeguards.
Russia also stated that any changes to the IAEA safeguards system must be made in such a way that the new methods are understood by all States members of the Agency and have their unanimous support.
Russia continued to support Agency’s efforts to ensure the reliability and improve the effectiveness of its verification mechanism and continued to support relevant IAEA General Conference decisions.
Russia continued to advocate for certain principles that must be followed in any reforms to the IAEA safeguards system and additionally clarified that they should apply to the State-level concept for safeguards being implemented by the IAEA.
Russia stated that it considers the application of State-level approaches to the implementation of safeguards as an ongoing large-scale experiment by the secretariat and interested member States, which will become a recognized practice only if the State-level concept is approved by the IAEA policymaking bodies.
National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.
https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf
National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
The UK Safeguards Support Programme 2016–2021 contributed to IAEA safeguards assessment and evaluation through provision of technical expertise, analytical laboratory services, training for IAEA inspectors and analysts, and cost-free experts to the IAEA Department of Safeguards, all aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system.
The UK supported the IAEA Board of Governors decisions on integrated safeguards and the State-Level Concept throughout this period. The 10th Review Conference national report confirmed the UK's commitment to strengthening the safeguards system through universalisation of the Additional Protocol and support to IAEA safeguards implementation.
The UK supports the IAEA’s efforts to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system. The UK Safeguards Support Programme has contributed to this effort. The UK states that from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2025, the UK Safeguards Support Programme provided just under £8m of in-kind and financial contributions to over 35 tasks within the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification.
The UK is supporting the IAEA in addressing safeguards challenges posed by small modular reactors (SMRs), recognising that without robust oversight their global deployment could raise proliferation risks. Through the IAEA’s “Safeguards by Design for SMRs” initiative, the UK Safeguards Support Programme has partnered with Rolls-Royce SMR in March 2024 to provide technical expertise, assess safeguards implications of SMR designs, explore implementation strategies, and identify design modifications to facilitate effective safeguards. This collaboration, supported by UK government funding and industry participation, demonstrates the UK’s commitment to strengthening international safeguards and enabling the safe, secure, and peaceful deployment of advanced nuclear technologies worldwide.
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2022). UK support programme to IAEA safeguards 2016–2021. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/633a94e1e90e0772dc9651b5/uk-support-programme-to-iaea-safeguards-2016-2021.pdf
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
The United States has historically been a strong supporter of ensuring that the IAEA’s safeguards protocols are evolving to meet new geopolitical challenges. For example, prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States supported the IAEA’s transition to the State-Level Concept for safeguards, which encouraged holistic, country-specific assessments rather than facility-by-facility accounting.
In addition, the United States is by far the largest financial supporter of the IAEA’s activities. The Government Accountability Office assessed that from 1998 through 2004, U.S. voluntary cash contributions, on average, were 83 percent of the total of all such member states’ contributions.
In particular, the United States contributed significant extrabudgetary funding towards IAEA’s safeguards work prior to the current Review Cycle. For example, in 2006, the United States donated approximately three-quarters of the IAEA’s entire pot of extrabudgetary funding for safeguards activities. The United States also initiated and helped corral support for a 20 percent increase in the IAEA’s budget.
The United States has historically been a strong political and financial supporter of ensuring that the IAEA’s safeguards protocols are evolving to meet new geopolitical challenges. In its comments in support of the Safeguards Implementation Reports during the current Review Cycle, the United States has encouraged states to conclude and strengthen their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and to modify or rescind outdated small quantitates protocols, and has put significant financial resources towards engaging with partner countries to aid them in this transition.
U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. "Safeguards Implementation at the State Level." September 10, 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20190824161944/https://vienna.usmission.gov/130910sg/.
Ford, Christopher Ashley. "Nonproliferation Lessons Learned." U.S. Department of State, 2018. https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/nonproliferation-lessons-learned/.
U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. U.S. statement as delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate. IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Agenda Item 8(b): Safeguards Implementation Report for 2021. June 8, 2022. https://vienna.usmission.gov/on-the-2021-safeguards-implementation-report/.
Government Accountability Office. “IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed.” GAO-06-93. October 2005. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-93.pdf.
Ford, Christopher, A. “Cluster 2: Implementing Provisions of the NPT Related to the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” U.S. Department of State, May 9, 2007. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/npt/122644.htm.