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Pillar 2

Action 35

The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

France has concluded several intergovernmental agreements related civil nuclear cooperation with third countries (Australia, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mexico, Morocco, Mongolia, Morocco, Tunisia, Vietnam, Slovakia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Argentina, Switzerland….), which include clauses that make the materials, goods and equipment subject to IAEA safeguards. Civil nuclear cooperation with third countries is conditioned to their implementation of safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

France has continued to implement intergovernmental agreements related civil nuclear cooperation with third countries which include clauses that make the materials, goods and equipment subject to IAEA safeguards.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK provides standing secretarial support to the Zangger Committee and regular technical expertise to the NSG through its Technical Experts Group. The UK participates fully in the NSG's information exchange groups and uses meetings of the NSG Consultative Group to share best practice and national experience in implementing the NSG guidelines.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom states that it continues to abide by its export control commitments under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in line with the NSG and ZC control lists. It continues to provide standing secretarial support to the Zangger Committee and regular technical expertise to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and uses meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Consultative Group to share best practice and national experience in implementing the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

The UK's national export control framework is underpinned by the Export Control Order 2008, which has been amended during the current cycle. The Export Control (Amendment) Regulations 2025, which came into force on 20 May 2025, amended the Export Control Order 2008 and the assimilated Dual-Use Regulation to update controls on nuclear materials, facilities and equipment in line with changes agreed under the NSG guidelines. A second set of amendments came into force on 16 December 2025.

This ensures that the UK's export control regime remains aligned with international non-proliferation standards to prevent UK exports from contributing to nuclear weapons programmes and supporting implementation of NPT Articles I, II and III, as envisaged by Action 35.

The UK Strategic Export Control List, derived from and routinely updated in line with changes to the control lists administered by the multilateral export control regimes including the NSG, was most recently updated in December 2025.

The UK has also fully implemented UNSCR 1540 since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As a vice-chair of the 1540 Committee, the UK works with states, the IAEA and the G7 Global Partnership to monitor and assist implementation.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 25. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Department for Business and Trade (2025). UK Strategic Export Control Lists. December. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69415ba1f065108822537524/uk_export_control_list_2025.pdf

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2021). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States has been a member of all major multilateral non-proliferation regimes for decades, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The United States maintains control lists that correspond directly to those maintained by the aforementioned export control regimes, and also includes unilateral control imposed by the United States, such as the U.S. Munitions List. Exporters generally must submit a license request with the appropriate agency for any item on one of these lists. License requests typically go through an extensive review process, including review by interested U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the intelligence community, and NASA, as well as interested bureaus within the Department of State. The U.S. export control system also relies on catch-all controls to ensure that dual-use exports, which are not otherwise subject to export controls, are capable of being tracked, discussed with the recipient government, or even denied as an export transaction.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States maintained its membership and adherence to all multilateral non-proliferation regimes of which it is a member, and continued to advocate for the institution of responsible nuclear export controls. Specifically, in a statement at the 2024 NPT PrepCom, U.S. officials noted that “Robust export controls are thoroughly consistent with, and in fact facilitate and enhance confidence in, the right of States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. Though there is ample rhetoric to the contrary, there is no evidence that strategic trade controls, including the multilateral export control regimes, hamper the international exchange of technology for peaceful uses or hinder any country’s economic development.”

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “Overview of U.S. Export Control System.” https://2009-2017.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/index.htm.

Warden, Jim. “Statement to Cluster 2 of the 2024 NPT PrepCom.” U.S. Department of State. Jule 26, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-to-cluster-2-of-the-2024-npt-prepcom/.