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Pillar 3

Action 58

Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

France and the European Union have supported politically, financially and technically the establishment, under the aegis of IAEA, of a low enriched uranium bank in Kazakhstan, to provide guaranteed access to nuclear fuel for States unable to obtain it on the regular competitive market. Orano supplied some of the low enriched uranium stored in the bank.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

As the international Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) bank is operational in Kazakhstan, no new elements have been implemented for this action.

Sources

The EU co-funded Low Enriched Uranium Bank becomes operational at a purpose-built facility in Kazakhstan, European Union External Action Service, 17 October 2019, Vienna, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-co-funded-low-enriched-uranium-bank-becomes-operational-purpose-built-facility-kazakhstan_en

Joint Statement by the Leaders of Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Norway, People’s Republic of China, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, UAE, UK and USA on the Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan, Nuclear Security Summit, Washington DC, 5 April 2016, https://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-leu-fuel-bank

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Russia has consistently expressed support and engaged in cooperation with the IAEA to develop the concept of assured supplies and multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle services.

In 2007 Russia has established the International Uranium Enrichment Center and a guaranteed low-enriched uranium reserve in Angarsk that is intended to provide uranium enrichment services for civilian nuclear power programmes and allow participating countries access to nuclear fuel.

In 2019, Russia has facilitated supply of the first and second batches of low-enriched uranium to the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan

Russia has supported international research on closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies

Russia participated in the activities of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and Generation IV International Forum (GIF)

In 2017, Russia hosted the IAEA International Conference on Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Russia continued to express support and engaged in cooperation with the IAEA to develop the concept of assured supplies and multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle services.

Russia continued to operate the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk

Russia continued to support international research on closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies

Russia continued to participate in the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO).

As of 2026, the total amount of annual voluntary extrabudgetary contributions from Russia exceeded 5 million euros.

Russia supported and facilitated the establishment of BRICS Nuclear Energy Platform in 2024. The platform provides support for the introduction of advanced reactor designs and nuclear fuel cycles for BRICS member States and partners.

In 2025 Russia announced plans to build the world’s first nuclear power system with a closed fuel cycle in the Tomsk Region by 2030.

Sources

Vladimir Putin. Address to the Global Atomic Forum, 25 September 2025.

https://russiaeu.mid.ru/en/press-centre/news/vladimir_putin_addresses_the_global_atomic_forum/

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In March 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a UK-proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance, co-sponsored by the EU, Russian Federation and United States. The NFA is a contractual arrangement designed to assure the continued supply of nuclear fuel to a country should its supply be disrupted for political reasons, with the IAEA as co-signatory.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United Kingdom has been a supporter of multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The UK is a member of the grouping of five G7 nuclear nations (Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) known as the ‘Sapporo 5’, formed in April 2023 on the margins of the G7 Energy Ministers’ meeting in Japan. The Sapporo 5 resolved to promote public-private investment in enriched uranium production capacity free from Russian material, and to establish a resilient global uranium supply market free from Russian influence and the potential to be subject to political leverage. By September 2024, the group announced it had mobilised $5.6 billion to establish a global commercial nuclear fuel supply chain, exceeding the initial $4.2 billion target committed at COP28. The UK says it is investing up to £300m with industry to establish a UK High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) supply chain to fuel next-generation Advanced Modular Reactors and provide a commercial supply from 2031.

There is no indication the Nuclear Fuel Assurance process has been taken forward. It is not mentioned in the 2022 or 2026 UK NPT national reports and the IAEA’s description of the NFA remains static.

Sources

IAEA. Nuclear Fuel Assurance. n.d. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-fuel-assurance

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2023). Civil nuclear fuel cooperation between Canada, France, Japan, United Kingdom and United States: statement. 8 December. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-fuel-supply-multilateral-alliance-between-uk-and-international-partners/civil-nuclear-fuel-cooperation-between-canada-france-japan-united-kingdom-and-united-states-statement

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2024). Civil nuclear fuel cooperation: statement on investments for nuclear fuel security. 19 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-nuclear-fuel-cooperation-statement-on-investments-for-nuclear-fuel-security.

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2026). Statement on civil nuclear fuel use. 4 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-nuclear-fuel-use-statement/statement-on-civil-nuclear-fuel-use.

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, he emphasized U.S. support for an international fuel bank to allow countries to access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. In 2019, the United States contributed nearly $50 million to the establishment and operationalization of the IAEA’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In 2023, the United States, alongside Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, established the Sapporo 5 group to support the stable supply of reactor fuels and to reduce global reliance on Russian supply chains by increasing the availability of commercial free-market alternatives in the supply of civil nuclear technologies. At COP28, these leaders pledged $4.2 billion in government-led investments “to establish a resilient global uranium supply market free from Russian influence.”

Sources

The White House. “Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered.” Office of the Press Secretary. April 5, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Statement on Civil Nuclear Fuel Cooperation Between the United States, Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom.” April 17, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-civil-nuclear-fuel-cooperation-between-united-states-canada-france-japan-and.

U.S. Department of Energy. “At COP28, U.S., Canada, France, Japan, and UK Announce Plans to Mobilize $4.2 Billion for Reliable Global Nuclear Energy Supply Chain.” December 7, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-us-canada-france-japan-and-uk-announce-plans-mobilize-42-billion-reliable-global.