China
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Sources
France
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
In 2022, France participated in the Working Group on Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, helping to improve the Convention’s peer review processes. At the European level, the French Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection is active within the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association, established in 1999. The Association aims to develop a common approach to nuclear safety and the regulation thereof, particularly within the European Union. The Association’s key products, the “safety reference levels” documents, promote the harmonization of safety approaches in relation to nuclear power reactors, research reactors, radioactive waste and decommissioning. The Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection is part of the European Technical Safety Organisations Network.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
In 2023, France participated in the Working Group on Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, helping to improve the Convention’s peer review processes. The French Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection has remained active during the current Review Cycle to promote the sharing of best practices with industry actors in France but also internationally.
Sources
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
ASNR Website, https://www.asnr.fr/actualites
ASNR Resources, https://www.asnr.fr/information/contenus-pedagogiques
Russia
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
Russia consistently expressed support for and facilitated exchange of information and best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security.
In 2006, Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism which supports exchanges of best practices in combating nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security.
Since 2010 Russia annually contributed 1 million US dollars to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. These funds support projects related training on nuclear security and assistance to interested countries. Russia also hosted IAEA peer review and advisory services missions focusing on nuclear safety and security at Russian nuclear facilities.
Russia also implemented capacity building and training programmes for Russian and international specialists in the civil nuclear sector, including on nuclear safety and security.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Russia reaffirmed the central role of the Agency in the context of ensuring international cooperation on nuclear security. Russia contributed to the establishment of the IAEA Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre which became operational in 2023.
Russia continued to issue financial contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and invite the IAEA to conduct peer review and advisory services focusing on nuclear safety and security to Russian nuclear facilities.
In 2022-2026, there were four IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions to Russian facilities.
Russia continued to implement capacity building and training programmes for Russian and international nuclear specialists.
Russia reported that, as of 2026, over 2,800 foreign specialists from 95 countries have been trained at the Technical Academy of State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom” and more than 5,000 operational personnel have been trained for nuclear power plants that Russia is building abroad.
Sources
National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.
https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf
Statement by Russia. “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts” (Vienna), 11 February 2020.
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/02/cn-278-russian-federation.pdf
Statement by Russia. “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future” (Vienna), 21 May 2024.
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/05/cn-321_russianfederation_eng.pdf
International Atomic Energy Agency. Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar.
https://www.iaea.org/services/review-missions/calendar?year=&type=All&location=503&status=2889
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
United Kingdom
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The UK committed to implementing and universalising nuclear security conventions, sharing best practice and expertise with international partners, and supporting global nuclear security assistance. It made annual contributions to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund totalling over £15 million from 2017 to 2020, and worked to enhance nuclear security globally through its Global Nuclear Security Programme.
The UK hosted the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission in 2019 to assess UK adherence to the IAEA’s safety standards with a follow-up in 2024. The UK supports activity to enhance nuclear security globally through the Global Nuclear Security Programme and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
The United Kingdom states that it consistently supports “the sharing of best practice in the area of nuclear safety and security including through IAEA peer reviews and the publication of mission team reports.”
The UK has provided support and assistance to countries looking to develop and enhance their civil nuclear security through its Global Nuclear Security Programme and Nuclear Threat Initiative's Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security.
In February 2025, the government announced an independent Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce to review the UK's civil and defence nuclear regulatory framework. The review had a broad scope covering legislation, regulator scope and resource capacity, regulatory outcomes, nuclear sector culture and processes, and innovation and new nuclear. The Taskforce published its final report in November 2025, setting out 47 recommendations for the government to speed up the delivery of nuclear projects at lower cost and on time.
Sources
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, 5 November.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 27. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.
United Kingdom (2026). Nuclear Regulatory Task Force. Working Paper submitted to the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2026/WP.9. 2 March.
United States
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s International Nuclear Security
for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) program partners with the U.S. advanced nuclear reactor industry, as well as nascent nuclear power countries, to improve the security of future U.S. advanced reactor exports through early integration of security by design; build nuclear security capacity in countries embarking on new nuclear power programs; and strengthen the global nuclear security regime to develop international guidelines and resources on evolving security considerations posed by advanced and small modular reactors.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
During the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to engage the U.S. advanced nuclear reactor industry and nascent nuclear power countries through its INSTAR program. Through this program, INSTAR funds national laboratory experts to engage directly with vendors and act as a resource on physical security, target set identification, nuclear material accounting, insider threat, cyber security, transport security, and sabotage mitigation capabilities. Experts are available to provide technical guidance to companies on security concepts; regulatory approaches; current and emerging technologies; Security by Design considerations; and theft and sabotage risk mitigation.
The United States also regularly engaged with international partners and the domestic nuclear industry to share best practices on nuclear safety and security. For example, in 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation on increasing collaboration on the technical reviews of advanced reactor and small modular reactor technologies.
Sources
U.S. Department of Energy. “International Nuclear Security for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR).” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/international-nuclear-security-advanced-reactors-instar-fact-sheet.
U.S. Department of Energy. “Nuclear Nexus: International Nuclear Security.” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nuclear-nexus-international-nuclear-security.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “Memorandum of Cooperation Between the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), the United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), and the NRC.” March 12, 2024. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/who-were-working-with/international-cooperation/nrc-cnsc-moc.